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Risks in the world abound. Every day there is a chance that each of us
could be in a car accident. Or, one of us could be the victim of a tornado,
flood or earthquake. Every day someone becomes deathly ill from an
insidious disease. Our properties are in constant peril—one’s house could
catch fire at any time or a tree could fall on it during a storm. Any one of
these events could have devastating financial consequences, and they are
just a few of the many risks that impact our daily lives. One of the
principal ways we manage risk is by purchasing insurance. In the absence
of insurance, many losses would cause financial ruin. Thus, for some lines
of insurance such as health and homeowners, insurance serves a critical
function in America as a social safety net.
This Article explores the role the profit imperative has and should
have in risk management today. As publicly traded stock companies,
which are driven by the profit imperative, have come to dominate the
insurance industry in the past two decades, inherent conflicts between the
purpose of insurance and the goal of insurers have developed. These
conflicts are manifested by insurers’ refusal to insure certain people and
businesses and the hollowing out of the coverage provided by insurance
policies through the addition of exclusions for risks of loss that insurers
have concluded do not provide adequate profit margins. The profit
imperative also has forced insurers and their policyholders to become
adversaries with respect to the valuation and payment of claims because
every dollar paid for a policyholder’s loss is a dollar that cannot be paid to
the insurer’s shareholders.
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After discussing the history of these conflicts, the Article then
explores various ways to resolve them. Some of the resolutions are: the
elimination of some exclusions in policies, the creation of restrictions on
insurers’ ability to refuse to insure certain people and businesses, and the
imposition of penalties when insurers fail to pay claims timely and in full.
For socially critical lines of insurance, if any voids in insurance markets
were to develop due to the current laws being changed in the ways
discussed in the Article, then state sponsored insurance programs could be
created to fill the voids.
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INTRODUCTION
The world is a very dangerous place. Every day there is a chance that
each of us could be in a car accident. Or, we could be the victims of a
natural catastrophe such as a tornado, flood or earthquake. Every day
someone is diagnosed with a deadly disease. Our properties are in constant
peril—houses catch fire every day and trees regularly fall on houses during
storms. Any one of these events could have devastating financial
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consequences, and they are just a few of the many risks that surround our
daily lives. There a number of ways we attempt to reduce these risks. For
example, we fasten our seat belts and maintain our vehicles in an attempt to
avoid accidents and minimize the consequences of accidents. We cut down
trees next to our houses and install smoke alarms in an attempt to prevent
damage to our homes and the people in them. In addition to loss
prevention measures, however, one of the principal ways we manage risk is
by purchasing insurance. This Article focuses upon our attempts to transfer
the risk of loss to insurers and explores the role that the profit imperative
plays with respect to insurers’ behavior.
The central thesis of this Article is that the profit imperative is in
conflict with the objective of insurance. The purpose of insurance is to
transfer the risk of loss from entities that do not want, or cannot afford, to
absorb the financial losses that arise from natural and unnatural events to
well-capitalized insurers that are able to spread the risk of loss across large
pools of policyholders. In the absence of insurance, we face the risk of
financial ruin with each passing car or storm. On the other hand, the
providers of the vast majority of insurance today are publicly traded stock
companies whose corporate mandate is to maximize profits for the benefit
of their shareholders. In the absence of legal or regulatory intervention, the
profit imperative dictates that insurers accept the transfer of risk only with
respect to entities and perils that they can consistently insure at high profit
margins, leaving those in most need of insurance without it. This
irreconcilable conflict between the purpose of insurance and the profit
imperative is the primary source of discord in insurance law today. This
conflict did not always exist and it does not have to continue to exist
unmitigated.
As originally conceived and implemented in America in the mid1700s, insurance functioned as a social safety net through which a
community or group as a whole acted for the benefit of the unlucky few
who suffered losses. People and businesses each contributed a premium to
a “mutual” company or group to create a pool of money from which losses
were paid. Essentially, the insurance company acted as a third-party
administrator that collected the premiums to create the pool of money from
which losses would be paid and then paid such losses as they arose.
Initially, these mutual insurance companies only covered fire losses. Over
time, however, insurance expanded to cover the other myriad risks of loss
that exist.
The need for insurance is even greater today than it was in the 1700s.
Imagine being a homeowner in Oklahoma when tornadoes rip through the
state each spring or on the coast in the Gulf of Mexico, Florida or the East
Coast when a hurricane makes landfall. Or, imagine being diagnosed with
cancer. Now imagine that the afflicted homeowner or person does not have
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property insurance or health insurance. What happens to such people?
Financial ruin unless they are the beneficiaries of the generosity of
strangers or a government bailout.
Not only does insurance provide peace of mind and ensure one’s
financial security in the event of a catastrophe in ways that hoping for a
government bailout or the generosity of strangers do not, but insurance
actually has become a necessity to live and function in America today. It is
required, for example, in order to legally drive a car to work or to obtain a
mortgage for a home. In short, in most parts of this country a person
cannot hold a job or be a homeowner today without insurance.
Yet, as the need for insurance has increased, insurers’ willingness to
cover certain people and risks has decreased. Although the profit
imperative began forcing insurers to begin refusing to insure some perils,
such as floods, in the 1950s and 1960s, insurers’ efforts to avoid insuring
certain people and certain risks have accelerated since the 1970s. The
reason is simple: profits. The idea of insurance as a social safety net, in
which a group of people or businesses as a whole acts for the benefit of the
unfortunate few, was lost when the corporate structure of insurance
companies shifted from mutual companies to for-profit, publicly traded
stock companies. Although this shift had been occurring for some time, it
accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s to the point that the vast majority of
insurance companies today are for-profit, publicly traded stock companies.
As profit-maximizing enterprises, publicly traded stock companies’
overriding mandate is to make as much money as possible for their
shareholders. Policyholders who pay premiums are merely revenue
streams for publicly traded stock companies. And the payments of
policyholders’ losses are expenses that reduce insurers’ profits. Thus, the
profit imperative dictates that insurers relentlessly seek to increase
revenues while decreasing expenses for the benefit of their shareholders.
Insurers have sought to fulfill this mandate on both the front end and
the back end of the business of insurance. On the front end—the
underwriting stage—insurers quickly have moved to eliminate coverage
from their policies for risks that do not have satisfactory profit margins as
soon as such risks have been identified. Insurers also have used the claims
data they have collected and analyzed over the course of many decades to
identify the people who are most likely to have losses (i.e., the “bad” risks)
and then refuse to insure those people.
On the back end—paying claims—insurers have become professional
litigators in order to avoid or at least minimize the amounts they have to
pay for their policyholders’ losses. In the words of one insurer, an insurer
today is “a professional defender of lawsuits.”1 Or, as described by one
1. John N. Ellison et al., Bad Faith and Punitive Damages: The Policyholder’s Guide
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federal judge, insurers are like “major league team[s]” in the game of
“hardball litigation.”2
Indeed, when it comes to the payment of
policyholders’ losses, insurers and policyholders are adversaries. The
profit imperative dictates that insurers minimize the amounts they pay for
their policyholders’ losses in order to maximize their shareholders’ profits.
Although much of this Article is dedicated to developing the claim
that the profit imperative that drives insurers today is inconsistent with the
purpose of insurance and is the primary source of conflict in contemporary
insurance law, the Article proposes some normative solutions to the
complex problem of ensuring that insurance is available for all at
affordable prices despite the profit imperative that currently drives insurers.
For example, in the absence of a finding that an insurer acted in bad faith,
which is very difficult to prove, insurers currently have no incentive to pay
the full amount of a loss timely because their liability for failing to do so is
limited to paying the unpaid amount they already owe plus interest.
Consequently, under the current laws, the profit imperative demands that
insurers attempt to pay less than the full value of losses and to make
payments on losses as slowly as possible because there are no negative
consequences for doing so. Although the number of potential solutions to
this problem is limited only by our imaginations and thus a truly fulsome
discussion of the subject is beyond the scope of a single article, one idea is
to create and impose penalties on any insurer that refuses to pay a loss
timely or offers less than the full value even if the insurer’s conduct does
not amount to bad faith. For example, if a fact finder determines that the
value of a claim is $1000, but the insurer only paid or offered to pay $700,
then the insurer would be liable not just for the additional $300 plus
interest, but also for the policyholder’s attorneys’ fees and a 20% penalty
on the unpaid $300 (which, not coincidentally, is the same penalty amount
the IRS imposes on taxpayers who underpay their taxes).
To address the problem of insurers refusing to cover the most common
types of catastrophic risks we face in this country such as hurricanes,
tornadoes and floods under property policies, legislation could be passed
that prevents insurers from excluding coverage for such risks. Also, for
lines of insurance that are determined to be socially critical such as
property, auto and health insurance,3 additional restrictions could be placed

to Bad Faith Insurance Coverage Litigation, in Environmental Insurance: Emerging Issues
and Latest Developments on the New Coverage and Insurance Cost Recovery, Philadelphia:
ALI-ABA 159 (2008) (quoting Liberty Mutual Insurance Company’s Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 7, filed July 5, 1988, National Union
Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 696 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D. La. 1988)).
2. Adolph Coors Co. v. American Ins. Co., 164 F.R.D. 507, 509 (D. Colo. 1993).
3. As discussed in Part III.C.4, this idea currently is being implemented for health
insurance under the Affordable Care Act.
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on insurers’ ability to refuse to insure applicants who are willing to pay for
the insurance but currently are rejected by insurers because they are
considered “bad” risks.
Of course, we need to recognize that if certain exclusions in policies
were eliminated and insurers’ ability to refuse to insure certain applicants
were reduced, then insurers may refuse to sell the insurance. There are at
least three reasons for this: (1) insurers believe that some risks such as
catastrophes are highly correlated risks for which they cannot charge
premiums high enough to satisfy their target profit margins; (2) insurers’
shareholders demand profitability on both long-term and short-term bases,
which could not be ensured if insurers were required to insure catastrophic
risks because the losses associated with such risks create periods of shortterm unprofitability; and (3) the profit margins on applicants who are “bad
risks” are inadequate or negative.
So, what would happen if insurers were to refuse to sell insurance in
the normative legal regime being discussed? State sponsored insurance
programs could be created to fill any voids. Unlike private insurers, state
sponsored insurance programs are able to take a long-term view regarding
the financial needs of insurance programs that cover catastrophic risks and
“bad risk” policyholders because such programs do not have to generate
short and long-term profits for shareholders.
In many respects, state sponsored insurance programs are actually
better vehicles to fulfill the purpose of insurance than private insurers for
certain types of insurance. For example, the tax and accounting laws
currently create disincentives for insurers to insure catastrophic risks
because they discourage insurers from accumulating and holding the capital
needed to pay widespread catastrophic losses. Further, publicly traded
stock companies that accumulate large capital surpluses become takeover
targets for corporate raiders. State sponsored insurance programs, on the
other hand, can accumulate capital for the purpose of paying catastrophic
widespread losses tax-free and cannot be acquired by corporate raiders.
The premiums charged by state sponsored insurance programs also
should be lower than insurance sold by private insurers. Insurers spend
literally billions of dollars annually on advertising in order to compete for
customers’ premium dollars. Indeed, auto insurance commercials during
prime time television are so pervasive that everyone knows the Geico
Gecko and Progressive’s spokeswoman, Flo. A sitcom based upon Geico’s
cavemen commercials was actually created at one point because Geico’s
commercials ran so frequently that the Geico cavemen became part of
America’s pop culture. Policyholders, of course, ultimately paid for all of
those commercials that made the Geico cavemen a pop culture
phenomenon through their premiums. If private insurers were to decline to
sell property insurance that covers catastrophic risks, then state sponsored
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insurance programs obviously would not need to spend money advertising
because they would not be competing with dozens of other insurers for
premium dollars. Thus, the premiums they would charge should be lower.
Insurers also spend significant amounts of money on underwriting and
claims handling in their attempts to ferret out the “bad” risks to avoid
insuring them and to fight to lower the amounts they must pay for their
policyholders’ losses. State sponsored insurance programs, on the other
hand, would not need to spend significant amounts on underwriting and
could spend less on claims handling because the profit imperative would
not mandate that they fight to reduce the amounts paid on legitimate claims
because their primary goal would not be the maximization of profits for the
benefit of their shareholders. Thus, the premiums they charge should be
lower for these reasons as well.
Further, under state sponsored insurance programs, policyholders and
their insurers would not need to be adversaries during the claims
adjustment process. Although such programs would, of course, still need
to verify the legitimacy of the claims submitted, state sponsored insurance
programs would not have shareholders demanding quarterly dividend
payments that are generated by paying as little as possible for
policyholders’ losses and waiting as long as possible to make such
payments regardless of the value or validity of the losses. Thus, the claims
payment process should be far less adversarial.
In many respects, state sponsored insurance programs would be a
natural evolution of states’ existing involvement in the insurance industry
because states already heavily regulate the insurance industry by, among
other things, establishing capital surplus requirements, approving premium
rates and policy language, and running insurance guarantee programs to
cover the claims of insolvent insurers.
Although limited in scope and type, state sponsored insurance
programs already are being used for some lines of insurance in certain parts
of America. California, for example, created an earthquake insurance
program when insurers began refusing to cover earthquakes following the
Northridge earthquake in 1994. Similarly, the Gulf and southeastern
coastal states have been forced in recent years to become the primary
sources of insurance for property damage caused by hurricanes as insurers
have refused to sell insurance that covers such losses. In addition, for
many years, states have had auto insurance programs for drivers who
insurers refuse to insure.
Even better evidence, however, of the viability and desirability of state
sponsored insurance programs can be found in Europe. Several European
countries have state sponsored insurance programs that are demonstrably
cheaper than private insurance and, unlike insurers in America, are viewed
quite favorably by their citizens when it comes to the payment of claims.
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This Article develops the claim that the principal conflict in risk
management and insurance law today can be traced to the inconsistency
between the purpose of insurance and the profit imperative that is driving
private insurers in three parts. Part One discusses the origins and purpose
of insurance. It begins with a discussion regarding risk transfer and the
theory of the “law of large numbers” that underlie the concept of insurance.
It then traces the evolution of insurance from contracts of “bottomry”
created for maritime traders in Babylonia in 2250 B.C. to the creation of
mutual companies in America to serve as a social safety net for fire losses
in the 1700s to the rise of for-profit, publicly traded stock insurance
companies that dominate the insurance market today. Part One concludes
with a discussion regarding the crucial role insurance plays in modern
society.
Part Two sets forth the bases for the claim that the profit imperative
has driven insurers to refuse to cover any risks that threaten their profit
margins. As examples to develop the claim, insurers’ treatment of
environmental claims and asbestos-related liabilities, as well as insurers’
creation of numerous exclusions under comprehensive general liability
policies, are discussed. Insurers’ refusal to insure certain risks of loss such
as earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes under property policies, as well as
the insertion of numerous exclusions in such policies, is also discussed.
Part Two concludes by discussing how the profit imperative has caused the
claims payment process under both consumer and commercial lines of
insurance to become adversarial as insurers have sought to minimize the
amounts they pay for covered losses.
Part Three discusses some ideas regarding normative solutions to the
conflict between the profit imperative and the purpose of insurance in risk
management that exists today, as well as the anticipated objections to such
solutions. The implementation of the ideas contemplated in this Article,
with or without private insurers’ willing participation, should allow the
purpose and role of insurance in risk management—the transfer of the risk
of loss from those who cannot afford to bear the loss to those who can—to
once again be fulfilled.
II.

THE ORIGINS AND PURPOSE OF INSURANCE

A.

The Concept of Insurance

The concept underlying insurance is quite simple. A person or a
business transfers the risk of loss to another entity in exchange for the
payment of a premium.4 The principal reason most people and businesses
4. J. David Cummins, Should the Government Provide Insurance for Catastrophes?,
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purchase insurance is to avoid uncertain, but potential, future losses.5 The
purchaser of insurance incurs a relatively small certain loss by paying a
premium in order to avoid the risk of larger, uncertain future losses.6
Although the law has sought to diminish insurance’s similarity to gambling
by requiring, for example, that a person purchasing insurance actually have
an “insurable interest” in the object being insured (i.e., a reason to want the
person or item insured not to be injured or damaged),7 a person who
purchases insurance is hedging against the risk of something terrible
happening. As described by one court, a person who buys insurance is
attempting to “buy financial protection and peace of mind against
[un]fortuitous losses.”8
The entity that accepts the risk of loss typically spreads the risk of loss
across a large number of policyholders.9 Although it is expected that some
people will suffer losses, only a subset of the total pool of people insured

88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 337, 342 (2006).
5. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 10 (5th ed. 2012) (observing how people become more risk averse as the
potential magnitude of loss increases). Corporations sometimes purchase insurance for
reasons beyond risk aversion. For example, there are tax advantages for corporations that
purchase insurance. Corporations can deduct premiums as business expenses. See TOM
BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY
INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 63 (2010) (explaining how the tax
benefits of corporate insurance turn on the favorable treatment of market insurance over
self-insurance). On the other hand, a corporation that simply puts aside the funds that would
be used to pay premiums into a reserve fund to pay claims would not be able to receive a
deduction for those amounts and the company also would have to pay taxes on the income
the reserves earned. Id. Insurance also protects against the risk of bankruptcy. Id. at 63–64.
In addition, many lenders require corporate borrowers to have insurance so corporations that
do not have insurance incur higher borrowing costs. Id. at 64. Similarly, when a company
is confronting a crisis that creates an uncertain future due to, for example, a catastrophe such
as a flood, the company’s ability to raise capital is limited and insurance provides a ready
source of funds to address such situations. Id. at 65. Some companies also purchase
insurance for the loss-prevention expertise of insurers that the companies themselves lack.
Id. at 66. Finally, insurance protects the shareholders’ investments in the company by
lowering the volatility of a company’s share price by smoothing the company’s profits and
losses that otherwise would be impacted by the payments of settlements and judgments. Id.
at 67.
6. See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5 (describing how many people would
prefer to lose one dollar with certainty rather than take a one in ten thousand chance of
losing ten thousand dollars); JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE
COMPANIES DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 14 (2010) (describing
the concept of insurance in operation as a person or entity willing to exchange a small,
certain loss to avoid a larger, uncertain loss).
7. See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 255–58 (exploring the origins and
purpose of the insurable interest requirement).
8. FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 19 (quoting Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
98 P.3d 409, 415 (Utah 2004)).
9. FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 14.
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will actually incur losses. This concept is known as the “law of large
numbers.”10 In essence, the large percentage of fortunate people that pay
for insurance but do not suffer a loss receive peace of mind through their
purchase of insurance and their premiums subsidize the unfortunate few
people who do suffer losses.11 In short, everyone pays a premium to create
a pool of funds from which the unfortunate few that suffer losses will be
paid. Under this concept of insurance, if some people do not participate in
the risk pool, whether by choice or exclusion, then the fulfillment of the
purpose of insurance is reduced.12
In a non-profit context, the insurer simply functions as an intermediary
that facilitates this transfer of risk from the individual to the group. For
some lines of insurance, such as auto insurance, the insurance industry can
predict with great accuracy the likelihood and extent of the actual risk of
loss that is transferred because it has collected very detailed and accurate
information regarding the likelihood and severity of injuries with respect to
various risk classifications. For example, insurers know that on average:
(1) there will be 21 fatalities for every 1000 licensed drivers, (2) a driver
aged 21 to 24 is almost three times as likely to be involved in a fatal crash
while intoxicated as a driver 55 to 64 years old, and (3) the average
collision repair cost for all cars is $3131.13 Knowing what each
policyholder pays in premiums and the amount of the losses, the insurer is
able to predict with great accuracy the expected return it will receive for
accepting the transfer of risk.
As discussed more fully below in Part II. C, for-profit, publicly traded
stock companies, which are operating for the benefit of their shareholders
rather than as third party intermediaries for the benefit of pools of
policyholders, use claims data and risk classifications to charge different
premium rates to the people in the various risk classifications or to refuse to
insure certain people or risks they deem unprofitable or inadequately
profitable.

10. Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance
Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 203 (2012); Cummins, supra note 4.
11. See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk
Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 377 (2003) (explaining how insurance is predicated on
the existence of a large number of fortunate members’ premiums paying for the losses of the
unfortunate few); Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance As Moral
Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 16 (1999) (noting how the basic premise of insurance is
collective responsibility for harms that befall individuals).
12. See Baker, supra note 11, at 378 (stating that the reduction of the ability of the
insurance pool to spread risk has an adverse effect on the insurance pool).
13. FEINMAN, supra note 6.
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The Origins of Insurance and the Demise of Mutual Insurance
Companies

Insurance traces its roots back to Babylonian maritime traders as early
as 2250 B.C. The Babylonians developed what were known as contracts of
“bottomry,” under which investors would loan money or goods to a
merchant at a high interest rate with the understanding that the borrower’s
obligation to pay the interest or the debt would be eliminated if the vessel
carrying the goods sank or was pirated.14 The Phoenicians, Greeks, and
Romans subsequently used contracts of bottomry.15 Centuries later,
bottomry contracts evolved into what we know today as insurance contracts
with Lloyd’s of London being the first formal insurer of vessels and cargo
in the late seventeenth century.16 Following the Great Fire of London in
1666, insurers also began selling insurance to cover fire losses for nonmarine properties.17
In the United States, insurance initially developed as community
projects for fire insurance in which members of a community contributed to
a pool of money from which a member would be paid if his property were
destroyed by a fire.18 The first one of these “mutual” companies was called
the “Philadelphia Contributorship for Insuring Houses from Loss by Fire”
and was established in Philadelphia in 1752, with Ben Franklin as one of its
first directors.19 Similar mutual companies subsequently were formed
throughout the country to protect people and businesses against fire
losses.20 Thus, through the collective actions of communities and groups of
businesses, mutual insurance pools were developed as social safety nets for
individuals and businesses through which a community or group as a whole
acted for the benefit of the unlucky few who suffered losses.21
In mutual companies, the members who contribute to the pool of
funds used to pay for losses own the company, and they are insured under
the pool.22 In contrast, in a for-profit, publically traded stock company,

14. See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 16 (finding the earliest traces of risk
transference resembling insurance within ancient Babylonian society).
15. Id. at 16–17.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 16–18.
18. Id. at 18; see also FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 21 (noting how early insurance
companies, including lumbermen insurance companies, were keenly aware of their
responsibility to pay claims since they were initially formed to share losses).
19. FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 21.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 22–23.
22. See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 47–48 (noting that mutual
companies are not designed for profit, but instead to provide insurance to the members of
the company); James A. Smallenberger, Restructuring Mutual Life Insurance Companies: A
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shareholders contribute capital to the company, but they are not insured by
it; their interest in the company is limited to maximizing the return on their
investments.23 Thus, the collective interests of a mutual insurance
company’s owners and policyholders are aligned, while a for-profit,
publicly traded stock insurance company’s owners’ and policyholders’
interests are not. Indeed, as will be discussed more fully in Part II.C, there
is a significant conflict of interest between corporate shareholders and
policyholders when it comes to paying policyholders’ claims.
Mutual companies, however, are a dying corporate form for
companies in most lines of insurance. Although it was the dominant
corporate form when insurance companies were first created hundreds of
years ago for the purpose of allowing a community or group of businesses
to pool their assets together to protect the unlucky few that suffered losses,
competition for insurance premium dollars and capital largely has driven
mutual companies out of the market for most lines of insurance.24 There
was a dramatic shift from the mutual company form to for-profit, publicly
traded stock companies in the 1990s.25 The primary justification given for
the change is that stock companies can raise capital and diversify into other
lines of insurance more easily than mutual companies.26
Mutual
companies’ primary means of raising capital is by generating and retaining
earnings, unlike stock companies, which can simply issue new shares.27
Other justifications for the switch from the mutual form to stock form
include the claim that stock companies can attract better employees and
managers by offering stock options, as well as the changes to the federal
income tax laws in the 1980s that resulted in the elimination of the
favorable tax treatment that mutual insurance companies had been
receiving.28
C.

Insurance’s Essential Role in Society
Today, insurance’s role in society has become far larger than it was in

Practical Guide Through The Process, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 513, 516 (2001) (defining mutual
insurance company).
23. Smallenberger, supra note 22.
24. FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 48.
25. Otgontsetseg Erhemjamts & J. Tyler Leverty, The Demise of The Mutual
Organizational Form: An Investigation of the Life Insurance Industry, 42 J. MONEY, CREDIT
& BANKING 1011, 1011 (2010).
26. See, e.g., Smallenberger, supra note 22, at 518 (detailing competitive market
advantages); Henry Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual versus
Stock, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 125, 138 (1985) (explaining corporate fundraising via bond
issuance).
27. Hansmann, supra note 26.
28. Hansmann, supra note 26; Smallenberger, supra note 22, at 518.
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the 1700s. One insurance law scholar describes insurance as a “social
instrument” because of its important and socially desirable role of
protecting the limited assets of individuals and business owners against
catastrophic losses by spreading and transferring the risk of such losses to
well-capitalized insurers.29 Indeed, insurance has become integral to
people’s lives and the conduct of business in developed countries such as
America.30 Without insurance, people and businesses simply could not
function in today’s world. For example, anyone who wants to purchase a
house using a bank to finance a mortgage is required to have homeowners
insurance in an amount adequate to cover the mortgage.31 Anyone who
wants to drive a car must have auto insurance.32 Almost all states require
businesses to have workers’ compensation insurance.33 In many business
transactions, such as construction contracts, one party typically is required
to maintain insurance to cover the project.34 In short, because insurance
fills an important need in modern society, it has become a necessity in
many respects.
In addition, aside from mandatory insurance, if someone lives or does
business in areas prone to disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, or floods,
they need insurance to protect their homes and businesses. Without it, they

29. Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social
Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1489 (2010). See also Erik S. Knutsen, Auto
Insurance as Social Contract: Solving Automobile Insurance Coverage Disputes Through a
Public Regulatory Framework, 48 ALBERTA L. REV. 715, 716 (2011) (noting that because
auto insurance is mandatory in order to ensure that victims are compensated and
policyholders have no ability to change the policy language, the terms used in auto policies
should not be interpreted strictly without regard to the social purpose underlying the
policies); Stone, supra note 11, at 26–29 (“Because virtually every adult citizen participates
in various forms of mandatory insurance, from automobile liability insurance to
unemployment insurance, old-age pensions and disability insurance, everyone is exposed to
two of the moral assumptions of these programs: collective responsibility for the well-being
of individuals and individual responsibility for the well-being of others.”).
30. Stempel, supra note 29, at 1497.
31. Id. See also MARTIN F. GRACE ET AL., CATASTROPHE INSURANCE: CONSUMER
DEMAND, MARKETS AND REGULATION 83 (2003) (stating that “homeowners insurance . . . is
essentially mandatory” in discussing the demand for homeowners insurance).
32. Stempel, supra note 29, at 1497–98. See also MARK. S. DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION
TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 222 (8th ed. 2005) (discussing the financial
responsibility laws that require drivers to purchase insurance); EMMETT J. VAUGHAN &
THERESE VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 539–41 (8th ed. 1999)
(conducting a 50-state survey of compulsory automobile liability insurance laws).
33. Stempel, supra note 29, at 1498. See also GEORGE E. REJDA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK
MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 556 (9th ed. 2005) (noting that “[a]ll states today have
workers compensation laws”).
34. Stempel, supra note 29, at 1499, 1505 (discussing construction contracts that
require the builder to maintain various types of liability insurance and Amtrak’s insistence
that the State of Rhode Island “buy $200 million in liability insurance if it wants to extend
commuter rail service to Warwick and South County”) (internal quotations omitted).
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risk bankruptcy with each passing storm. Of course, if the insurers from
whom the policies are purchased do not pay the full value of the actual
losses when they arise due to exclusions or aggressive claims payment
practices, then the purpose of the insurance is frustrated because the risk of
loss was not truly transferred from the policyholder to the insurer. The net
result in situations where a person is uninsured or is underpaid for his
losses is that both the person and society are in a worse position because
the person or its business could be financially devastated by the losses.
Another reason that insurance has become central to our lives is the
concern that innocent victims will go uncompensated in the absence of
insurance if they are injured.35 Many injured people would not be able to
pay their medical bills or recover lost wages in the absence of insurance
because tortfeasors often do not have sufficient assets to adequately
compensate the people they injure.36 Indeed, ensuring that innocent victims
will be compensated is the primary reason automobile insurance is
mandatory in this country.37
Because of its importance to society today, insurance has become a
huge industry with global premiums exceeding $4 trillion with the United
States alone accounting for 28% of that amount.38 Accounting for 7% of
the world’s gross domestic product, the insurance industry has grown to
become one of the largest and most important industries in the world.39
So, what has happened now that insurance has become one of the
largest and most important industries in the world and is dominated by
publicly traded stock companies? As is discussed in the next two parts,
35. See, e.g., Leland R. Gallaspy, Breland v. Schilling: Louisiana’s Approach to
“Injuries Expected or Intended from the Standpoint of the Insured”, 52 LA. L. REV. 199,
200 (1991) (detailing the public policy rationale for providing insurance in the case of tort
victims); Karen Cuttler, Liability Insurance for Intentional Torts—Subrogation of the
Insurer to the Victim’s Rights Against the Insured: Ambassador Insurance Co. v. Montes, 32
RUTGERS L. REV. 155, 157 (1979) (describing the deterrent effect of financial responsibility
on potential tortfeasors’ decisions); see also Yousuf v. Cohlmia, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1288
(N.D. Okla. 2010) (stating that compensating a wrongdoer’s innocent victims would
outweigh the concern that the wrongdoer would unjustly benefit); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 826 F. Supp. 155, 163–64 (E.D. Va. 1993) (the public policy of
compensating innocent victims outweighs the public policy of not permitting coverage of
intentional action); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kambly, 319 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982) (“[T]here is great public interest in protecting the interests of the injured party.”).
36. See generally Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 603, 607 (2006) (noting how commonplace being judgment-proof is as a result of the
laws).
37. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 29, at 1498 (noting how every state effectively
requires auto insurance in order to license a car); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 924–
25 (stating that the obvious purpose of such mandatory coverage is to provide victims of
automobile accidents with access to funds to cover their losses).
38. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 18.
39. Id.
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insurers, as all publicly traded stock companies strive to do, have dedicated
themselves to increasing their profits for the benefit of their shareholders.
They have done so by: (1) reducing the coverage that is provided under
their broadest policy forms; (2) refusing to insure the people and entities
for which they cannot charge premiums high enough to meet their target
profit margins; and (3) reducing their primary expenses—the amounts they
pay for their policyholders’ losses. All of these actions are in conflict with
the purpose of insurance.
III. INSURERS’ REFUSAL TO INSURE RISKS OR ENTITIES THAT
DO NOT PRODUCE CONSISTENT PROFITS IN BOTH THE
SHORT TERM AND LONG TERM
In this part, to illustrate how the profit imperative has impacted
insurers’ behavior, several examples of insurers’ reduction of the scope of
coverage provided under the broadest forms of commercial liability and
property policies sold is discussed first. Then, insurers’ claims handling
conduct under both consumer and commercial lines of insurance is
addressed.
A.

Insurers’ Contraction of Coverage Provided Under Comprehensive
General Liability Policies

A prime example of insurers systematically reducing the coverage
their policies provide in pursuit of profits can be seen when one reviews the
history of the Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policy. The CGL
policy, which was renamed the “Commercial” General Liability insurance
policy by insurers in 1986 in order to avoid the broad coverage
implications of the word “comprehensive,” was first created in the 1940s.40
Although the first CGL policy was sold in 1941, the policy form that
became widely used was first issued in 1943.41 The two rating bureaus that
initially created the CGL policy eventually merged and became the
Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO).42
40. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing The Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability And
Insurance After Three Decades Of Dispute, 12 Conn. Ins. L. J. 349, 355 (2006); see, e.g., E.
W. SAWYER, COMPREHENSIVE LIABILITY INSURANCE, Chs. 2–3 (1943) (describing the merger
of the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau (MIRB) and National Bureau of Casualty and Surety
Underwriters (NBCSU) to form the Insurance Services Office (ISO)). Sawyer was an
attorney for the NBSCU.
41. Stempel, supra note 40, at 355.
42. Id. ISO is an influential organization within the insurance industry that
promulgates standard form insurance policies, including CGL policies that insurers across
the country use to conduct their business. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d
871, 879 n.6 (Fla. 2007). In particular, the organization develops its own standard policy
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Prior to 1943, there were numerous different lines of liability
insurance available to cover specific risks such as Public Liability
Insurance and Premises Operations Insurance that were issued by various
insurers with varying policy language.43 Due to the numerous specific lines
of insurance available, policyholders were able to purchase only the
specific lines of insurance they needed, which meant insurers had a
customer base of only policyholders who believed they had a meaningful
risk of loss under each of the selected lines of insurance.44 The CGL policy
was created to broaden the insurance pool and to address other problems
associated with splintered lines of coverage such as insurers’ use of
differing terms and conditions in their policies.45 As is still the case today
with almost all insurance policies, the terms of CGL policies were drafted
by insurers, set forth in lengthy, complex contracts of adhesion, and then
sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.46
When created, the CGL policy became the broadest form of liability
coverage that could be purchased because the insurer agrees under CGL
policies to pay “all sums” for which the policyholder becomes liable for
“bodily injuries” or “property damage” caused by an accident.47 Despite
the expansive coverage grant, insurers embraced the CGL policy because

forms and makes them available to its member insurers, which then adopt them and present
them to state insurance regulators for approval. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764, 772 (1993) (discussing the ISO’s role in crafting traditional CGL insurance). ISO
is comprised of approximately 1400 property and casualty insurers and “is the almost
exclusive source of support services in this country for CGL insurance.” Id. As a result,
“most CGL insurance written in the United States is written on [ISO] forms.” Id.
43. Stempel, supra note 40, at 356; Sawyer, supra note 40, at 11–17.
44. Stempel, supra note 40, at 356; Sawyer, supra note 40, at 12–18.
45. Stempel, supra note 40, at 356; Sawyer, supra note 40, at 16.
46. See, e.g., JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 1 LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES §
4.06[b] at 4–37 (Aspen 2d ed. 1999) (“In a sense, the typical insurance contract is one of
‘super-adhesion’ in that the contract is completely standardized and not even reviewed prior
to contract formation.”); Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested
Language Defense, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1072, 1091 (2010) (describing the
“hyperstandardization” of insurance policies); James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance
Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation? Text versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
995, 996 (1992) (“The only part of the standard policy that is generally customized to the
consumer-insured is the Declarations Sheet . . . . [T]here is little, if any, freedom to
negotiate the standardized language of the insurance contract that determines the scope of
coverage.”); Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125
(2007) (“[I]n some lines of insurance, all insurance companies provide identical coverage on
the same take-it-or-leave-it basis.”); Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Policies,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263 (2011) (citing sources that discuss the standardization of insurance
policies and then arguing homeowners insurance policies are not as standardized as other
lines of insurance); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1153 (1990)
(“[P]roperty owner’s liability insurance contracts are standardized across insurers in a form
few insureds have the power or experience to bargain around.”).
47. Stempel, supra note 40, at 358.
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they were able to charge higher premiums and could avoid situations where
policyholders only purchased the lines of coverage under which the
policyholders thought they most likely would have claims.48 In addition,
because insurers often would not have to pay claims until many years after
the premiums for such policies had been paid, insurers would be able to
earn investment income on the premiums until funds were needed to pay
claims.49 The insurers’ profits created by this delay are referred to as the
“float.” Warren Buffet has famously acknowledged that BerkshireHathaway earns most of its profits from the “float,” as opposed to
underwriting profits (i.e., the amount of premiums collected that exceed the
amount paid for claims).50 Indeed, in 2007, for example, insurers made $58
billion in investment income.51
Under the CGL policy forms used between 1943 and 1966, the
policies covered liabilities “caused by accident.”52 The term “accident”
was not defined, and thus courts were left to determine what constituted an
“accident.”53 As the case law developed, courts increasingly concluded that
“accidents” were not confined in time and space to a single event and could
include injury-producing events that took place over longer spans of time.54

48. Stempel, supra note 40, at 358; Sawyer, supra note 40, at 115; John H. Eglof,
Liability Insurance, The Outside 42 BEST’S FIRE AND CASUALTY NEWS 19 (May 1941)
(arguing that the bundling of different lines of liability insurance into a comprehensive
policy would enable insurers to obtain higher premiums because they would not need to sell
different lines of liability insurance). Eglof was the Supervisor of the Agency Field Service
of the Travelers Insurance Company.
49. See, e.g., MARK R. GREEN, RISK AND INSURANCE 147 (4th ed. 1977) (“In property
and liability insurance, investment income has accounted for a very substantial portion of
total profits and has served to offset frequent underwriting losses.”); Eliot Martin Blake,
Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and Tort Reform in an Information
Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 422–23 (1988) (“Insurers do not simply hang onto premiums,
of course; they invest them for the time period between payment of premiums and payment
of losses . . . . The role of investment income in the [insurance] industry is particularly
important. Studies have concluded that investment income allows the industry to remain
profitable as a whole even with significant negative underwriting losses.”).
50. Stempel, supra note 40, at 357, n. 18; FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 16.
51. FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 16.
52. Stempel, supra note 40, at 363.
53. Id. at 363–64.
54. Compare Jackson v. Employers Liab. Ass. Co., 248 N.Y.S. 207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1931), aff’d, 259 N.Y 559 (1932) (an “accident” must be confined in time and space) with
Shipman v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 125 SE. 2d 72, 75–76 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962) (an
“accident” may take place over time). See also ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY
INSURANCE §1.22, 1–91 (1985) (“[t]he insurance industry concluded that insurance should
be afforded to the public on certain kinds of risk which would cover injuries resulting from
exposure to harmful conditions over a period of time”; Stempel, supra note 40, at 363
(“when the asbestos mass tort arrived, the basic contractual and legal framework of
coverage determination combined with the peculiarities of asbestos to require coverage
beyond that anticipated by insurers when they first accepted the risk”).
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As a result of the judicial trend in the case law, among other reasons,
the CGL policy form was revised in 1966 to substitute the term
“occurrence” for the term “accident.”55 The term “occurrence” was defined
as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions
which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured.”56 Significantly, the change to
the “occurrence” form meant that it became undisputed that insurance
coverage was provided not only for events, but also for gradual, ongoing or
continuous injury situations.
Indeed, according to one insurer
representative, the change to the “occurrence” policy form made it clear
that:
The definition [of “occurrence”] embraces an injurious exposure
to conditions which results in injury. Thus, it is no longer
necessary that the event causing the injury be sudden in
character. In most cases, the injury will be simultaneous with the
exposure. However, in some other cases, injuries will take place
over a long period of time before they become manifest. The
slow ingestion of foreign matters and inhalation of noxious fumes
are examples of injuries of this kind. The definition serves to
identify the time of loss for application of coverage in these
cases, viz, the injury must take place during the policy period.
This means that in exposure-type cases, cases involving
cumulative injuries, more than one policy contract may come into
play in determining coverage and its extent under each policy.57
In short, coverage was triggered if an injury or damage took place during
the policy period whether or not the “accident” causing the injury or
damage occurred at that time.
At the time the 1966 CGL policy form was adopted, a CGL workbook
used by a major property/casualty insurer gave the following example of an
“occurrence” that would be covered under the policy:
Wilson Chemical Company, the named insured, occupies the
second floor of a commercial building owned by West End
Cleaners. The West End operation occupies the entire first floor.
Wilson Chemical used acid as a raw material. The acid is stored
in 100 gallon drums on the second floor. One storage drum
developed a leak allowing acid to drip onto the floor. This
55. John J. Tarpey, The New Comprehensive Policy: Some of the Changes, 33 INS.
COUNS. J. 223, 223 (1966) (“The principal reason given for revision of the policies [from the
1955 form to the 1966 form] was adverse court decisions.”); Stempel, supra note 40, at 364.
56. Id. (quoting a leading insurance company representative).
57. Stempel, supra note 40, at 368 (quoting Norman Nachman, The New Policy
Provisions for General Liability Insurance, 10 CPCU ANNALS 196, 199–200 (1965)
(Nachman was the manager of non-automobile casualty insurance and multiple lines
insurance at the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters)).
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eventually caused extensive damage to several structural supports
of the building and caused a partial collapse which destroyed
much of West End’s equipment. West End Cleaners brought a
suit against Wilson Chemical for the replacement of their
equipment. Would Wilson’s CGL policy pay?
Yes. This situation would meet the second part of the definition
of occurrence, as the slow leak of acid constitutes a continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions.58
Thus, under the 1966 CGL policy form, insurers understood that long-tail
claims such as environmental claims were covered regardless of whether
the damage occurred gradually over time (e.g., due to “continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions”) or abruptly (e.g., due to a spill) so long
as the damage was not expected or intended by the policyholder.59
Another significant feature of CGL policies at this time was the fact
that such policies generally did not have aggregate limits except for
“products” and “completed operations.”60 Without an aggregate limit, an
insurer could be required to pay the maximum per occurrence limit in the
policy over and over again. Thus, an insurer with, for example, a $1
million per occurrence limit could be required to pay tens of millions of
dollars in claims under a single policy if multiple occurrences gave rise to
the liabilities.
1.

Insurers’ Creation of “Pollution” Exclusions to Avoid Covering
Environmental Damage

Because policyholders’ potential exposure for environmental
liabilities was extremely limited in the late 1960s under the existing laws
when the new “occurrence” CGL policy was created,61 insurers
aggressively marketed the policy on the basis that it provided coverage for
unintentional environmental damage.62 For example, in explaining whether
58. Stempel, supra note 40, at 372 (quoting THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY
POLICY WORKBOOK 11–12 (1973)) (title caps eliminated).
59. See, e.g., Morton International, Inc. v. General Acc. Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 849–
71 (N.J. 1993) (discussing in great detail the evidence, commentators’ views and case law
regarding the issue of whether the 1966 CGL policy form covered environmental
contamination).
60. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 40, at 376, 381–85 (discussing the absence of an
aggregate limit for general operations coverage under the CGL).
61. See, e.g., DONALD STERVER, LAW OF CHEMICAL REGULATION AND HAZARDOUS
WASTE §5.1, at 5–7 (1988) (noting that, prior to the passage of Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976, there was little regulation of hazardous wastes).
62. See Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W. 2d 570, 574 (Wis. 1990) (“At least
with respect to environmental claims, contemporaneous industry commentary on the 1966
CGL policy indicates that there was no intent to avoid coverage for unexpected or
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the 1966 CGL policy form covered unintentional, gradual environmental
damage, Gilbert Bean, a former executive of a major insurer and a member
of the General Liability Rating Committee that was in charge of reviewing
and drafting policy language, wrote:
Manufacturing risks producing insecticides, plant foods,
fertilizers, weed killers, paints, chemicals, thermostats or other
regulatory devices, to name a few, have severe gradual [property
damage] exposure. They need this protection and should
legitimately expect to be able to buy it, so we have included it.63
In another insurance industry paper, Mr. Bean stated the following with
respect to the issue of whether the new CGL policy form covered
environmental claims:
[There is] coverage for gradual [bodily injury] or gradual
[property damage] resulting over a period of time from exposure
to the insured’s waste disposal. Examples would be gradual
adverse effect of smoke, fumes, air or stream pollution,
contamination of water supply or vegetation. We are all aware of
cases such as contamination of oyster beds, lint in the water
intake of downstream industrial sites, the Donora, Pa.
atmospheric contamination, and the like.64
The insurers’ championing of the 1966 CGL policy form on the basis
that it provided coverage for unintentional, gradual environmental damage
did not, however, last long. With the adoption by most states of strict
liability under §402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965,65
followed by the enactment of the Federal Water Quality Improvement Act
of 1970,66 which imposed strict liability for certain discharges into bodies
of water, a new regime of environmental regulation and liability was on the
horizon. These legal developments, combined with several significant
environmental incidents such as the Torrey Canyon disaster and the Santa

unintended pollution.”). See also Thomas Reiter, David Strasser, and William Pohlman, The
Pollution Exclusion Under Ohio Law: Staying The Course, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1165, 1191–
93 (1991) (discussing the scope of coverage under “occurrence” CGL policies).
63. Gilbert Bean, New Comprehensive General and Automobile Program, The Effect
on Manufacturing Risks, presented at Mutual Insurance Technical Conference (Nov. 15–18,
1965), quoted in Robert Saylor & David Zolensky, Pollution Coverage and the Intent of the
CGL Drafters: The Effect of Living Backwards, 1 Mealey’s Litig. Rep. (Ins.) 4425, 4432
(1987).
64. Gilbert Bean, Summary of Broadened Coverage Under New CGL Policies With
Necessary Limitation To Make This Broadening Possible, Paper (1966), quoted in Saylor &
Zolensky, supra note 63, at 4438 n. 34.
65. WILLIAM PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON ON TORTS §98, at 692–94 (5th ed. 1984).
66. Pub. L. No. 91-224, §102, 84 Stat. 91 (1970) (formerly codified at 33 U.S.C.
§1161) (superseded by Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, §2, Pub.
L. No. 92-500, 88 Stat. 816 (1972)).
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Barbara offshore oil spill in the same time period,67 prompted the insurance
industry in the late 1960s to draft a specific exclusion for offshore oil
contamination incidents68 and a qualified pollution exclusion for CGL
policies in order to project a public image that insurers did not protect
intentional polluters.69
The qualified pollution exclusion, which also is known as the “sudden
and accidental” pollution exclusion, was first introduced in 1970 as an
endorsement and then became part of the CGL policy form itself in 1973.70
It was worded as follows:
This insurance does not apply. . . . (f) to bodily injury or property
damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape
of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals,
liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants
or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water
course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such
discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental
. . . .71
When the qualified pollution exclusion was first introduced and
insurers sought regulatory approval for its use in the early 1970s, insurers
represented to state insurance regulators that it was not a restriction on the
existing coverage for environmental damage under the CGL policy form.72

67. See, e.g., James Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims,
15 FORUM 551, 553 (1980) (“Pollution claims burst on the insurance scene following the
Torrey Canyon disaster and the Santa Barbara office-short drilling oil spills in 1969.”);
Warren Brockmeier, Pollution—The Risk and Insurance Problem, 12 FOR THE DEFENSE 77,
77–78 (1971) (discussing changes to CGL coverage after 1960s disasters).
68. See Brockmeier, supra note 67, at 78 (noting that the General Liability Governing
Committee of the Insurance Rating Board adopted an exclusion for oil contamination of
water on October 28, 1969); ROWLAND LONG, LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE §10A.04(2)
(Bender ed. 1990) (quoting the wording of the exclusion).
69. See, e.g., Letter from David E. Kuizenga, Secretary, Mutual Insurance Rating
Bureau, to Samuel H. Weese, West Virginia Insurance Commissioner (July 30, 1970),
quoted in Bradbury, Original Intent, Revisionism and the Meaning of the CGL Policies, 1
ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 279, 286–87 (1988) (“It is in the public interest that willful pollution of
any type be stopped . . . . If the insurance industry were to support continued pollution by
providing coverage . . . it would be considered as aiding and abetting these polluters,
thereby placing the insurance industry in public disfavor.”).
70. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 62, at 1196–1200 (discussing the sudden and
accidental” pollution exclusion); INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., FORM NO. GL 00 02 01 73,
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM, Exclusion (f) (1973), reprinted in
DONALD S. MALECKI, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE GUIDE, App. A (9th ed.
2011).
71. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., FORM NO. GL 00 02 01 73, COMMERCIAL GENERAL
LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM, Exclusion (f) (1973), reprinted in MALECKI, supra note 70, at
App. A.
72. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 62, at 1200–05 (discussing insurance industry
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And, as discussed above, it was undisputed that the existing policy
language covered gradual pollution if it was unexpected and unintended.73
Consequently, insurers did not reduce the premium rates charged for CGL
policies when they added the qualified pollution exclusion to them.74
Insurers’ position regarding the scope and meaning of the qualified
pollution exclusion changed, however, following the enactment of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)75 in 1976, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA), and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA) (collectively known as the “Superfund” laws).76 The
Superfund laws imposed retroactive, strict, and joint and several liability
for the remediation of environmental damage on any entity that was: (1)
the current owner and operator of the disposal facility, (2) the owner or
operator of the disposal facility at the time of the disposal, (3) the entity
that arranged for the disposal or treatment of a hazardous substance, or (4)
the transporter of a hazardous substance even if the entity handled the
chemicals and wastes in accordance with all of the historical laws and
industry standards.77
With the enactment of Superfund, policyholders were faced with a
total cleanup bill of several hundred billion dollars.78 When policyholders
turned to their CGL insurers to request payment of such liabilities, insurers’
response was multipronged: (1) notwithstanding the drafting history of the
qualified pollution exclusion and their representations to state insurance
regulators regarding the impact the exclusion had on coverage, they took
the position that the exclusion precluded coverage for any and all
environmental liabilities unless such liabilities resulted from an “abrupt”
release of contaminants;79 (2) after losing a number of cases regarding the

representations regarding the qualified pollution exclusion); Morton, 629 A.2d at 848–53
(discussing insurance industry’s explanatory memoranda of the pollution exclusion clause);
Joy Technologies, 421 S.E. 2d at 498–99 (discussing the IRB’s explanatory memorandum of
the pollution exclusion clause).
73. See supra notes 57–59, 62–64, and the accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 62, at 1202; Morton, 629 A.2d at 848, 853.
75. Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments, 94 Stat. 2334 (1980); Hazardous and Solid
Waste Act Amendments, 98 Stat. 3224 (1984) (current versions of both amendments are at
42 U.S.C. §§690–6992 (1988)).
76. 42 U.S.C. §§960–9675 (1988).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060, 1062 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (discussing CERCLA’s imposition of strict and joint and several liability); O’Neil v.
Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989) (discussing CERCLA’s retroactive and joint and
several liability); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1506 (6th Cir. 1989)
(discussing the same).
78. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 62, at 1171 (citing estimated industry liability for
cleanup of $150 billion to $700 billion).
79. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 62, at 1174 (noting that insurers generally argue
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meaning of the qualified pollution exclusion, they promptly drafted a new
“absolute” pollution exclusion that was intended to preclude coverage for
all environmental liabilities regardless of whether the environmental
damage was unexpected and unintended or caused by abrupt releases;80 and
(3) they litigated every other defense they could conceive in an all-out war
with their policyholders to avoid covering their policyholders’
environmental liabilities.81
The battle between insurers and their
policyholders regarding coverage for environmental claims lasted many
years82 and resulted in the creation of an extensive body of common law
regarding numerous issues and provisions contained in CGL policies due to
the breadth of the defenses insurers asserted to coverage.83 In short, when
faced with billions of dollars of liabilities that insurers previously had
that “sudden” means “abrupt.”); Morton, 629 A.2d at 852 (noting that insurers in litigation
excepted from the pollution exclusion clause discharge of pollutants that was “sudden” or
abrupt).
80. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., FORM NO. CG 00 01 11 85, COMMERCIAL GENERAL
LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM, Exclusion (f) (1986), reprinted in MALECKI, supra note 70, at
App. B; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing the “Absolute”
Exclusion in Context and in Accord with Its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT &
INS. L. J. 1, 2, 5–6 (1998).
81. See, e.g., PETER J. KALIS, THOMAS M. REITER & JAMES R. SEGERDAHL,
POLICYHOLDER’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE §§ 3.02, 3.03, 5.02, 5.03,
10.03, 10.04 (1st ed. 1997 & Supp. 2013) (discussing insurers’ arguments and the resulting
case law regarding insurers’ defenses to coverage based upon the “other insurance” clause,
allocation, number of “occurrences,” the terms “legally obligated to pay” and “damages,”
the “owned property” exclusion and the qualified pollution exclusion in environmental
insurance coverage disputes).
82. This battle resulted in dozens of law review articles being written regarding the
meaning and origins of the qualified pollution exclusion. See generally Nancy Ballard and
Peter Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the Comprehensive General Liability
Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 610 (1990) (discussing the meanings and
applications of “sudden” and “accidental”); Scott C. Stirling, Reasonable Expectations of
Insurance Coverage and the Problem of Environmental Liabilities, 22 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 395
(1990) (discussing CGL insurance liability and consumer reasonable expectations); Kenneth
S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942
(1988) (exploring the ways in which environmental liability has produced more severe and
enduring effects than those produced by the liability insurance crisis of 1985 and 1986);
Robert Chesler et. al., Patterns of Judicial Interpretation of Insurance Coverage for
Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 9 (1986) (examining, in the hopes of
forecasting the outcome of future disputes, liability that arises out of pollution in insurance
coverage litigation); Richard Hunter, The Pollution Exclusion in the Comprehensive
General Liability Insurance Policy, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 897 (examining the general
principals of insurance law that apply to the pollution exclusion as well as providing a
history of the exclusion and the CGL policy language that courts have relied on in
construing the exclusion); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Through
the Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L. J. 1237 (1986) (introducing a new method for judicial
analysis of whether insurance covers pollution related losses).
83. See KALIS ET. AL., supra note 81, at § 3 (discussing the insurance law related to
various coverage issues).
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stated were of a type covered by their policies, the profit imperative drove
insurers to add an exclusion for such claims going forward and to contest
the payment of the existing claims with all available means and resources.
2.

Insurers’ Creation of an “Asbestos” Exclusion to Avoid Covering
Asbestos Liabilities

A similar story can be told regarding insurers’ response to
policyholders’ presentation of claims for liabilities related to asbestos. As
is discussed in the preceding section, when the insurance industry adopted
the “occurrence”-based CGL policy form in 1966, insurers understood that
they were agreeing to insure bodily injuries and property damage that took
place gradually over time.84 Insurers accepted this increased risk exposure
because of the higher premiums and profits that they could earn.85
Because tort liabilities are one of the most common types of claims
that indisputably are covered under CGL policies, however, insurers were
not well positioned to successfully deny that they were responsible for
paying their policyholders’ asbestos liabilities when asbestos claims began
being submitted in the 1970s and 1980s. Consequently, in an attempt to
minimize their coverage obligations in order to preserve profits for their
shareholders when faced with what ultimately became billions of dollars of
liabilities that the insurers had agreed to pay under the policies they
drafted,86 insurers initially engaged in battles in which each insurer
challenged whether the injuries at issue occurred during its policy period
and, if so, how much of the liabilities it, as opposed to other insurers,
should pay. This litigation led to the development of the common law
regarding issues now commonly known as “trigger,” “allocation” and
“number of occurrences.”87
Once it became clear, however, that such battles simply had the effect
of shifting asbestos liabilities from one insurer to another without actually
decreasing the financial obligations of the insurance industry as a whole for

84. See supra notes 57–59.
85. Stempel, supra note 40, at 375.
86. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 40, at 351 (discussing the billions of dollars in costs
to insurers from asbestos claims).
87. See, e.g., Insurance Company of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulation, Inc., 633
F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980) (analyzing when the injury occurs in asbestos cases (i.e., trigger)
and how much each insurer whose policy is triggered by the injury should pay (i.e.,
allocation)); Keene Corporation v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C.
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982) (discussing the same). For a discussion
regarding the complexities involved in determining the amount each insurer should be
obligated to pay when a claim, such as an asbestos claim, triggers coverage in multiple years
and multiple layers of coverage, see Christopher C. French, The “Non-Cumulation Clause”:
An “Other Insurance” Clause by Another Name, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 375, 378–85 (2011).
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such liabilities, the insurance industry did the same thing it did with respect
to environmental claims—it drafted and adopted an asbestos exclusion that
initially was used as an endorsement and then became part of the standard
CGL policy form in 1986.88
Following the coverage wars between insurers and their policyholders
and the adoption of the asbestos exclusion, more than seventy
policyholders went bankrupt as a result of asbestos claims, but there was
only a 1 to 3% drag on insurers’ earnings and only a handful of insurer
insolvencies.89 To add insult to injury after first fighting with and then
abandoning their policyholders with respect to asbestos liabilities, some
insurers even objected to their policyholders’ bankruptcy reorganization
plans because insurers would be required to pay claims promptly under
such plans, thereby depriving the insurers of the “float” income they
generated by holding onto the policyholders’ premiums for as long as
possible and paying claims slowly over time.90 Such actions by insurers
were dictated by the profit imperative.
3.

Insurers’ Creation of Additional Exclusions to Avoid Paying
Losses

Educated by their experiences with asbestos and environmental
liabilities, insurers have drafted and adopted exclusions for CGL policies to
eliminate coverage for any risks they anticipate could be unprofitable to
insure. Today, the CGL policy form, the broadest form of liability
insurance that can be purchased, contains the following exclusions: (1)
expected or intended injury; (2) contractual liability; (3) liquor liability; (4)
workers’ compensation claims; (5) employer liability; (6) pollution; (7)
aircraft, auto and watercraft; (8) mobile equipment; (9) war; (10) owned
property; (11) damage to your product; (12) damage to your work; (13)
damage to impaired property; (14) product recall; (15) personal and
advertising injury; (16) electronic data; and (17) distribution of material in
violation of statutes.91 In short, the profit imperative has driven insurers to
restrict the coverage provided today under a policy form originally entitled
“Comprehensive General Liability Insurance” so substantially that the
coverage provided under the policy form is no longer even named or
described as “comprehensive.”

88. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 40, at 464 (discussing asbestos exclusions in the
CGL policy form).
89. Stempel, supra note 40, at 416–17.
90. Stempel, supra note 40, at 432–33.
91. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., supra note 70, FORM NO. CG 00 01 12 07, at App. J.
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Insurers’ Contraction of Coverage Provided Under “All Risk”
Property Policies

A similar story can be told regarding the profit imperative and
property insurance. Like CGL policies, which originally were intended to
provide coverage for all types of liability claims, insurers also sell property
and homeowners policies that purport to cover “all risks” except for
specific risks that are expressly excluded.92 In much the same way that
CGL policies were a consolidation of multiple lines of liability insurance,
“all risk” property policies evolved from “named peril” policies.
Historically, “named peril” policies covered one specified peril. The
earliest non-marine “named peril” policy was the fire policy, which
originated in London following the Great Fire of 1666.93
In the 1940s and 1950s, insurers began to bundle coverage for certain
named perils together under one policy. These policies became known as
“multi-peril” policies. Under “named peril” or “multi-peril” policies, any
perils that were not expressly listed as covered were excluded.94
“All risk” policies were then developed from “multi-peril” policies.95
Unlike “multi-peril” policies, however, “all risk” policies cover all perils
unless a peril is specifically excluded.96
Yet, as was the case with CGL policies, the coverage provided by “all
risk” policies has eroded over the years as insurers learned that insuring
certain risks or policyholders were not as profitable as the profit imperative
demanded. A few examples of this phenomenon are discussed below.
1.

Insurers’ Creation of an “Earth Movement” Exclusion to Avoid
Covering Earthquake Damage

Insurers have been refusing to cover earthquakes since even before
“all risk” policies were first created.97 As discussed above, “named peril”

92. See, e.g., Jeff Katofsky, Subsiding Away: Can California Homeowners Recover
from their Insurer for Subsidence Damages to their Homes?, 20 PAC. L.J. 783, 785 (1989)
(“In an ‘all-risk’ policy, all losses except those specifically excluded are covered. This is
the broadest form of coverage and has been so interpreted by the courts.”).
93. KALIS ET AL., supra note 81, at § 13.02[A][1].
94. Id. § 13.02[A].
95. Id. § 13.02[B].
96. See 5 John Alan Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice with
Forms § 3092 (4th prtg., rev. vol. 1987) (providing a background regarding “all risk”
policies); 3 New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide § 31.06[2][d] (Jeffrey E. Thomas
et al. eds., 2011) (explaining the difference between a “named perils” policy and an “all
risks policy”; 10A Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segulla, Couch on Insurance § 148:50 (3d ed.
1996) (discussing the increasing use of “all risk” policies).
97. See, e.g., Christopher C. French, The “Ensuing Loss” Clause in Insurance

1108

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 17:4

and “multi-peril” policies only covered perils that were expressly listed so
there was no coverage for earthquakes under those policies. Similarly,
standard form “all risk” homeowners policies98 and commercial property
policies99 historically have expressly excluded coverage for earthquakes.
Consequently, in California, a state in which residents acutely need
earthquake coverage, the state legislature enacted a statute that required
insurers that sold homeowners insurance in the state to also offer coverage
for earthquakes.100 So long as there were no earthquakes that resulted in
significant losses, insurers were willing to accept that requirement.
That, of course, changed in 1994 following the Northridge earthquake.
In less than a minute on January 17, 1994, insurers incurred over $12
billion in losses due to the Northridge earthquake in Southern California.101
In response, 93% of homeowners insurers in California either stopped
writing homeowners insurance or imposed strict limits on the policies that
they were willing to sell.102 And the insurers that did not completely
abandon California demanded significantly higher premium rates.103 For
example, State Farm requested a 97.2% rate increase.104 Due to insurers’
refusal to accept the risk of losses for earthquakes in California because
they did not view homeowners insurance as an adequately profitable line of
insurance for them in the short term if they could not exclude coverage for
earthquake losses, the State of California was forced to assume the primary
responsibility for insuring earthquake losses in most parts of the state.105

Policies: The Forgotten and Misunderstood Antidote to Anti-Concurrent Causation
Exclusions, 13 NEV. L.J. 215, 216 (2012) (“[In 1906], most property [insurance] policies in
the U.S. covered losses caused by fire, but also contained an ‘anti-concurrent causation’
exclusion that barred coverage for losses caused ‘directly or indirectly’ by earthquakes.”).
98. See, e.g., Brian Mattis, Earth Movement Claims Under All Risk Insurance: The
Rules Have Changed in California, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 29, 36–37 (1990) (citing State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co.’s Homeowners Policy Special Form 3, p. 7, Form FP-7103).
99. See, e.g., INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., FORM NO. CP 10 20 06 07, COMMERCIAL
PROPERTY BROAD FORM, EXCLUSION (B) (2007), reprinted in BRUCE J. HILLMAN,
COMMERCIAL PROPERTY, 404–05 (Susan Massmann, 4th ed. 201009) (“[w]e will not pay for
loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by . . . [an] [e]arthquake, including any earth
sinking, rising or shifting related to such event”).
100. See Cal. Ins. Code § 10081 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (requiring
earthquake coverage in residential property insurance issued in California).
101. Daniel L. Keller, Insurance; earthquake insurance—availability, 27 PAC. L.J. 867
(1996).
102. Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets,
and Uninsurable Risks, 64 J. RISK & INS. 205, 205 (1997).
103. Id. at 215.
104. Id.
105. See Véronique Bruggeman, Michael Faure, and Tobias Heldt, Insurance Against
Catastrophe: Government Stimulation of Insurance Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185, 195–96 (2012) (describing government intervention in
insurance through California’s CEA, which bears the primary earthquake risk in California).
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As discussed further below in Part III.B, insurers justify their refusal
to insure catastrophic risks such as earthquakes on the basis that the losses
are essentially “uninsurable” because the risks of loss are highly correlated
(i.e., they happen in concentrated areas and thus, insurers are not able to
adequately spread the risk of loss across a large enough pool of
policyholders to cover the losses when they occur).106 Although such
losses are correlated, that does not necessarily mean they are uninsurable.
Indeed, regardless of the merits of such arguments in past decades, this
justification is fading today due to reinsurance and catastrophe bonds.
Reinsurance is now a worldwide business in which global reinsurers
actually insure all or portions of another insurer’s portfolio of business
(known as “treaty” reinsurance),107 which means that the risk of an
earthquake loss in California, for example, is spread across policyholders
located not only in California, but also in distant places such as Australia
and Europe. Further, catastrophes do not regularly recur in the exact same
location so insurers collect many years, if not decades, of premiums from
policyholders in a location ultimately impacted by a catastrophe before the
catastrophe occurs.108 Insurers today also can further spread the risk of loss
through the sale of catastrophe bonds, pursuant to which insurers sell bonds
for specific types of catastrophes such as earthquakes and hurricanes to
investors who receive interest payments on the bonds and the return of their
principal at the end of the bond term unless the specified catastrophe
occurs, in which case the insurer keeps the principal and ceases to make
interest payments on the bonds. Since 1996, insurers have spread their
risks through the issuance of $51 billion in catastrophe bonds, with only
$682 million in losses or only 1.3% of the amount issued.109 Thus, in order
to tenably advance the argument that the risk of losses caused by
earthquakes in California cannot be spread across a large enough pool of
policyholders to be actuarially sound at the allowable premium rates, one
must take a narrow view of both the relevant time period in which to
evaluate the profitability of the premiums and investment income earned
versus the losses paid and discount the risk spreading impact that
reinsurance and catastrophe bonds have on the relevant pool of
policyholders and investors across which the risk of loss is spread.
Nonetheless, regardless of the strength of the argument that
catastrophic losses such as earthquakes are “uninsurable” due to the highly

106. See, e.g., Cummins, supra note 4, at 342–43; Bruggeman et al., supra note 105, at
187.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 206, 208.
109. See Al Yoon and Leslie Scism, Yield Hunt’s Latest Twist: ‘Catastrophe Bonds’,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2014, at C2 (“Natural disasters have saddled cat bonds with $682
million in losses since 1996, or 1.3% of the $51 billion issued . . . .”).
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correlated nature of the losses, the fact remains that most private insurers
do not want to sell insurance to cover earthquake losses so states, such as
California, that want their citizens to have coverage for such losses
generally must provide it themselves.
2.

Insurers’ Creation of a “Flood” Exclusion to Avoid Covering
Flood Damage

The insurance industry’s refusal to insure the risk of loss due to floods
is another tale of profits over purpose. Largely due to waterways
historically serving as a means of transportation, this country developed
along waterways, with the largest cities and population centers being
located on the coasts or along rivers. With water, however, comes periodic
flooding despite humans’ best efforts to prevent it. Indeed, the plain states
are fertile farming lands due to the fact that rivers, such as the Mississippi
River, enrich the soil in the surrounding areas by periodically flooding.110
Historically, the risk of loss due to flooding was not excluded under
“all risk” homeowners and commercial property policies.111 The losses
caused by floods over the years, however, have been extraordinary and
cause billions of dollars a year in damages.112 Indeed, nine out of ten
catastrophes in the United States each year are due to flooding.113
As is revealed by the preceding discussion regarding environmental,
asbestos and earthquake losses, when the damages associated with a
potential risk of loss are high, insurers lose their appetites for insuring such
risks. Consequently, by the 1960s, insurers had seen enough of flood
losses that they decided insuring losses due to flooding generally was not a
risk they wanted to accept for several reasons: (1) the near certainty of
losses in some areas; (2) the ruinous, widespread nature of flooding events;
and (3) the propensity of entities most likely to suffer from flooding losses

110. See Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons
from a Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1477 (2007) (“As on many
rivers, seasonal floods are natural, life-giving occurrences on the Mississippi River. Periodic
flooding allows the river to deposit rich soils outside its channel . . . .”); Adam F. Scales, A
Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C.
L. REV. 3, 6 (2007) (“The fertile soils of the alluvial plain constituted a tremendous resource
. . . .”); Edward V.A. Kussy, Wetland and Floodplain Protection and the Federal-Aid
Highway Program, 13 ENVTL. L. 161, 176 (1982) (discussing the positive role flooding has
in fertilizing wetlands).
111. See, e.g., Scales, supra note 110, at 7 (explaining the historic practice of including
flood losses in “all risk” policies).
112. See, e.g., Scales, supra note 110, at 6 (explaining the extent of the losses due to
flooding); Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and
Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 63, 66 (1985).
113. Houck, supra note 112, at 62.
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to purchase coverage for flooding while those unlikely to suffer such losses
decline to purchase such coverage.114 As a result, despite selling “all risk”
homeowners and commercial property policies, insurers almost uniformly
have refused to insure flood losses since the 1960s.115
Thus, the government again was left to fill the void created by
insurers’ refusal to cover flood losses. In this instance, the void has been
filled by the federal government through the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) that was initiated through the National Flood Insurance
Act of 1968.116 Unfortunately, the NFIP has not been a model for success.
Historically, it has suffered from low participation rates and has been
subject to widespread criticism due to problems such as the subsidization of
premium rates, outdated flood maps, periods of insolvency and inadequate
compensation amounts for losses due to the poor coverage provided under
the NFIP policy and the $250,000 liability cap under the program.117 The
recently passed Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 was
intended to address these problems.118 Only time will tell if the 2012
amendments to the Act will be effective, but it is clear that the profit
imperative is the reason private insurers refuse to cover flood losses.
3.

Insurers’ Attempts to Refuse to Cover Hurricanes/Windstorms

What about hurricanes? In light of insurers’ history of exiting lines of

114. Warren Kriesel and Craig Landry, Participation in the National Flood Insurance
Program: An Empirical Analysis for Coastal Properties, 71 J. RISK & INS. 405, 405 (2004);
See Scales, supra note 110, at 8–9 (explaining the contributing factors to the market failure
for flood insurance).
115. Kriesel and Landry, supra note 114, at 405. Contrary to the conventional wisdom
that no private insurers will provide coverage for the risk of flooding, for the right price and
for the right policyholders, there are some insurers that are still willing to provide limited
coverage under commercial property policies for floods. See, e.g., Penford Corp. v. Nat’l
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 662 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2011), reh’g denied (Dec. 19,
2011) (litigating whether the policyholder, whose manufacturing facility was located on the
banks of the Cedar River, had $50 million or $20 million in coverage for flood losses under
an “all risk” commercial property policy issued by AIG and ACE).
116. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4001 et seq. (2012).
117. See, e.g., Kriesel and Landry, supra note 114, at 406–07; Cummins, supra note 4,
at 358; Beth A. Dickhaus and Darrin N. Sacks, Recent Developments in Insurance
Regulation, 42 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 571, 582 (2007).
118. See Pub. L. 112–141, Div. F, Title II, § 100249, July 6, 2012, 126 Stat. 969
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 4001 et. seq.). It remains to be seen whether actuarially sound
premium rates will ever be charged because several coastal states successfully lobbied
against the new premiums rates that would be charged to their residents such that Congress
recently passed the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, which delays
the full implementation of actuarially sound premium rates mandated by Biggert-Waters
Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012. See Pub. L. 113–89, § 2, Mar. 21, 2014, 128 Stat.
1020 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 4001 et. seq.).
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insurance for risks that have or may result in substantial claims, hurricanes
would certainly seem to be the type of risk that insurers would prefer not to
insure. There were $23 billion in losses caused by Hurricane Andrew in
1992.119 Hurricane Katrina caused $43 billion in losses in 2005.120 Also in
2005, Hurricane Wilma caused $23 billion in losses.121
Not surprisingly, even though insurers already exclude coverage for
the “flood” portion of damage caused by hurricanes,122 insurers also have
sought, with some success, to completely exit the insurance market for
wind damage caused by hurricanes.123 Indeed, when state insurance
commissioners have refused to approve the premium rates that insurers
claim they need in order to meet their profit margin goals in coastal states,
insurers have simply refused to sell the insurance, unless the government
intervenes to prevent them from doing so.124 In Florida, for example,
insurers attempted to exit the market for hurricane coverage after Hurricane
Andrew in 1992, but legislation was passed to temporarily prevent them
from doing so.125 More recently, after the legislative prohibition expired,
most major private insurers have been refusing to insure coastal
properties.126 Consequently, Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, a
state sponsored insurance company, is by far the largest property insurer in
Florida.127
Like Florida, the states of Alabama, Louisiana, North Carolina,
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas also have been forced to create
hurricane insurance plans due to the lack of availability of affordable

119. Cassandra R. Cole, et. al., The Use of Post-Loss Financing of Catastrophic Risk, 14
RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 265, 266 (2011).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See, Part II.B.2, supra (highlighting the flood exclusions in insurance policies).
123. See, e.g., Donald T. Hornstein, Natural Disasters and the Financing of Fat Tails:
Lessons from the Economics and Political Economy of Weather-Related Insurance, p. 4, 6
(2013), available at http:\\ssrn.com\abstract=2249904; Elisabeth A. Ondera, Testing the
Waters: The South Carolina Coastal Captive Insurance Act As Part of A Multifaceted
Approach to the Coastal Insurance Conundrum, 59 S.C. L. REV. 599, 600 (2008)
(explaining instances where insurers have succeeded and failed at exiting the market).
124. Hornstein, supra note 123, at 4 (describing Allstate’s, Farmers Insurance’s and
Farm Bureau’s withdrawal from the insurance markets in Florida and North Carolina when
they did not obtain regulatory approval for their requested premium rate increases despite
the fact that premium rates already had been increased by 77% in Florida between 2001 and
2006).
125. 1993 Fla. Laws, ch. 93–401; Jonathan Brennan Butler, Insurers Under Fire:
Assessing the Constitutionality of Florida’s Residential Property Insurance Moratorium
After Hurricane Andrew, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 770 (1995); Jaffee and Russell, supra
note 102, at 206.
126. Bradley G. Bodiford, Florida’s Unnatural Disaster: Who Will Pay for the Next
Hurricane?, 21 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 149, 161–62 (2010).
127. Id. at 160.
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insurance coverage from private insurers.128 Insurers typically are required
to contribute to such plans as a condition to being allowed to sell insurance
in the state.129 Thus, although states have taken steps to slow or prevent
insurers from refusing to cover the wind portion of damage caused by
hurricanes, it is clear that insurers would not cover any portion of hurricane
losses in coastal areas if not for legislative requirements.
Finally, what about tornadoes? Since 1950, almost 58,000 tornadoes
have been observed.130 The average annual losses caused by tornadoes
between 1950 and 2013 were $5.9 billion.131 In recent years, however,
tornadoes have caused even more staggering devastation, particularly in the
“Hurricane Alley” states of Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Kansas,
Missouri, Oklahoma and Texas. In 2011, for example, tornadoes killed 550
people and caused $28 billion in property damage.132
Thus far, insurers have continued to cover tornado losses. Yet, in light
of the impact that the profit imperative had on insurers’ response to claims
for environmental, asbestos, flood, earthquake, and hurricane losses, how
long can we expect that insurers will voluntarily continue to cover damages
caused by tornadoes?
4.

Insurers’ Creation of Additional Exclusions to Avoid Covering
Other Risks as They Have Appeared

Now, insurers waste little time contemplating how to respond to new
risks of loss that could impair their profit margins when they appear.
Instead, ISO quickly drafts exclusions that are immediately added to
policies to avoid insuring potentially unprofitable risks of loss. For
example, as the year 2000 approached, there was wide spread concern
regarding potential computer crashes because computers had not been
programmed to turn from 1999 to 2000. Instead of assuring policyholders
that they would be covered under their policies in the event of losses due to
crashing computers, ISO drafted an exclusion for Y2K claims that was
added by endorsement to property policies well before the ball dropped in
Times Square on New Year’s Eve of 2000.133
Similarly, the first case in which a policyholder was awarded

128. Hornstein, supra note 123, at 2, 6; Ondera, supra note 123, at 601, 605–07.
129. Hornstein, supra note 123, at 6.
130. Roger A. Pielke, Jr., The Decline of Tornado Devastation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25,
2014, at A13.
131. Id.
132. Kevin M. Simmons, Daniel Sutter, and Roger Pielke, Normalized Tornado
Damage in the United States: 1950–2011, Environmental Hazards, 1 (2012).
133. Stempel, supra note 40, at 465.
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substantial damages by a jury for mold contamination occurred in 2001.134
Within a year, ISO had drafted a new mold exclusion for “all risk”
homeowners and other types of property policies in an attempt to avoid
paying any claims related to mold in the future.135
Just a year later in 2002, with the 9/11 terrorist attack losses projected
to be in the range of $30 to $100 billion,136 ISO quickly drafted and added a
terrorism exclusion to insurers’ policies.137 To fill the vacuum created by
insurers’ refusal to cover terrorism losses, and to calm a justifiably shaken
country, Congress intervened by passing the American Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 under which insurers are required to offer terrorism
coverage, but the federal government provides free reinsurance subject to a
$5 million, per occurrence deductible.138
Today, in addition to excluding coverage for earthquakes, floods and
mold, ISO’s standard form “all risk” homeowners policy also contains
exclusions for losses caused by: (1) collapse; (2) frozen pipes; (3) wear
and tear; (4) mechanical breakdown; (5) corrosion or dry rot; (6) settling;
(7) birds, vermin, rodents or insects; (8) ordinance or law; (9) power
failure; (10) neglect; (11) war; (12) nuclear hazard; (13) intentional loss;
and (14) governmental action.139 In short, as is the case with CGL policies,
the profit imperative has reshaped the “all risk” property policy sold by
insurers to homeowners today so that such policies cover quite a bit less
than “all” risks.
C.

The Impact of the Profit Imperative on Insurers’ Payment of Claims
Although insurers’ introduction of exclusions and refusal to insure

134. See Ballard v. Fire Ins. Exchange, No. 99-05252, 2001 WL 883550 (Tex. Dist. Ct.
Aug. 1, 2001) (a homeowner successfully sued her insurer for bad faith handling of a claim
for mold contamination and was awarded $32 million in total by the jury). See generally
Brian Lake, The Empire Strikes Back: The Insurance Industry Battles Toxic Mold, 33 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1527 (2007) (explaining the insurance industry’s response to the
explosion in mold litigation); Julie Elmer, A Fungus Among Us: The New Epidemic of Mold
Claims, 64 ALA. L. REV. 109 (2003) (providing a general overview of mold litigation).
135. Stempel, supra note 40, at 466.
136. Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism—and Crime, 102
MICH. L. REV. 268, 269 (2003).
137. See, e.g., Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism
Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 787, 803 (2005); Levmore & Logue, supra note 136, at 276,
296.
138. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002)
(codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.); Boardman, supra note 137, at 788–
89; Bruggeman et al., supra note 105, at 230.
139. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., FORM NO. HO 00 03 10 00, HOMEOWNERS POLICY FORM,
EXCLUSIONS (1999), reprinted in Kenneth S. Abraham, Insurance Law & Regulation, at
202–06 (5th ed. 2010).
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certain risks are examples of the profit imperative overriding the purpose of
insurance, perhaps the clearest manifestation of this phenomenon today can
be seen in the way insurers have approached reducing their principal
expenses—the amounts paid for their policyholders’ losses. In essence,
due to the profit imperative, when it comes to paying claims, insurers and
their policyholders are adversaries. In the words of one scholar, when it
comes to paying their policyholders’ losses, insurers do not act like “a good
neighbor” and policyholders are not in “good hands”.140 When a claim is
presented, the insurer and the policyholder become adversaries.141 The
reason is simple: every dollar an insurer pays on a claim is a dollar that
does not go to the insurer’s profits. The payment of claims is a zero-sum
game for insurers and policyholders. Thus, insurers and policyholders are
competing for the same dollars.
As the insurance industry became increasingly dominated by publicly
traded stock companies in the 1990s, insurers did what all successful forprofit businesses do. They closely analyzed their revenues and costs,
looking for ways to increase revenues and to decrease costs. What insurers
and their management consultants discovered when they looked at insurers’
expenses in the 1990s was that seventy-two cents of every premium dollar
collected was paid out in claims.142 Consequently, they concluded that in
order to increase their profits, they had to decrease the amounts paid in
claims.143 As the Chairman of one insurer explained to its employees in
1997:
In the long run, if we don’t win on the claim side of this business
we don’t win. Because that’s where all the leverage is. Threequarters of every dollar that leaves this company goes to pay
claims. So we have to build a long-term, sustainable competitive
advantage in claims. It’s as simple as that.144
The Vice President of Claims at another insurer described his
company’s approach to claims payments as follows:
[W]hat I’m talking about is the loss ratio, because that’s the
difference between profits and loss . . . . And if our competition
settles claims for less money than we do, we stand a good chance
of being non-competitive . . . . Now you all know losses are a
function of frequency and severity. You can’t do a whole lot
about the frequency but severity is strictly in our ballpark.145

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 190.
Id.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 63 (quoting Allstate Now, 24 (January 1997)).
Id. at 64 (quoting State Farm Divisional Claim Superintendents Conference
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In short, the profit imperative drove insurers to settle claims for less
money and to build a “sustainable competitive advantage in claims.”146
The insurance industry’s focus on reducing the amounts it paid in
claims in order to increase profitability was successful, as demonstrated by
the industry’s loss ratio, which is the amount paid in claims divided by the
amount collected in premiums. The loss ratio went from 67% in 1987 to
56% in 2007.147 Richard Stewart, the former Superintendent of Insurance
for New York and President of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, described the transformation that occurred in the insurance
industry regarding the emphasis placed on driving down the amounts paid
on claims as a shift “from orientation toward policyholders to orientation
toward stockholders . . . .”148 The end result, of course, is that the
“stockholders get the benefit of what is not paid out for claims.”149
1.

Insurers’ Claims Payment Practices under Consumer Lines of
Insurance

In practice, when it came to implementing the insurers’ focus on
profitability under consumer lines of insurance, such as auto insurance, the
basic instruction to claims handlers was to “deny everything you can.”150
In addition, claims handlers were no longer evaluated on the basis of how
accurately claims were being valued or how satisfied policyholders were
with the claims adjustment process, but rather, “based on the average
amount we paid out in claims.”151 Claims handlers were instructed “to
close a set percentage of claims without payment” and “to estimate the
condition of damaged vehicles at or below the national average to minimize
indemnity payments,” which, of course, meant the claims handlers were
being instructed to deny some claims and lower the amount paid on other
claims without regard to the true value of the claims.152 Claims handlers
were also instructed to try to settle claims before the policyholder retained
counsel because policyholders represented by counsel recovered 90% more
than unrepresented policyholders.153
With respect to some soft tissue injuries, such as whiplash, which

(1986)).
146. Id. at 63.
147. Id. at 15.
148. FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 47–48 (quoting Richard E. Stewart and Barbara D.
Stewart, The Loss of the Certainty Effect, RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 4, 29 (2001)).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 77 (quoting Declaration of William R. Hurst, (December 29, 2003)).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 79.
153. Id. at 88.
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generally were viewed with suspicion by insurers, one insurer adopted a
policy of “forcing soft tissue cases through arbitration and trial for the
purpose of sending a message to claimants, their attorneys, and the public
in general, that it is simply not profitable to pursue a soft tissue case when
[we are] the insurer.”154 The insurer’s policy was effective because the
average amount it paid on whiplash claims declined by 38%, from $4,500
to $2,783.155 The cumulative effect on the insurer’s bottom line was
dramatic, with the insurer’s profits increasing by over $100 million.156
Insurers also began using computer programs to value claims instead
of trained people. As with any computer program, it could be programmed
to consider whatever data was input. With the profit imperative in mind,
one insurer programmed the system to omit jury verdicts and settlements
that exceeded $50,000 when valuing claims because “profits would go up”
by lowering the average claim payments and executives would receive
significant bonuses as a result.157 Another insurer decided to pay only 80%
of the value of claims as calculated by the computer program.158
In addition, the profit imperative also has encouraged insurers to delay
the payment of losses they agreed to pay or were forced to pay for as long
as possible. Because of the “float”—the investment income earned on
premiums before the premiums are used to pay claims—it is now the
standard operating procedure for insurers to hold onto the money for as
long as possible before paying.159
2.

Insurers’ Claims Payment Practices under Commercial Lines of
Insurance

The profit imperative has driven insurers to behave similarly with
respect to commercial lines of insurance. The biggest differences,
however, are that the amounts at issue are often larger and corporate
policyholders, unlike consumers, frequently have the financial resources to
fight when insurers refuse to pay claims or attempt to settle claims for
pennies on the dollar.
Unlike individual consumers, corporate policyholders typically have
liability and property insurance programs that have multiple layers of
coverage which total tens or hundreds of millions of dollars of coverage in
each policy year, and some of their claims are worth tens or hundreds of

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 97 (quoting Affidavit of Grace Hess (March 12, 1998)).
Id. at 100.
Id.
Id. at 117 (quoting Affidavit of Maureen Reed (April 12, 2003)).
Id. at 118.
See supra notes 50, 51, 90 (explaining “float” and its use by insurers). See also
FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 16, 28, 32 (explaining risk aversion in the insurance industry).
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millions of dollars.160 Consider, for example, long-tail claims such as
environmental and asbestos liabilities discussed above in Part II.A.
Because the losses at issue totaled billions of dollars in the aggregate,
insurers fought their policyholders over every dollar using every legal
procedure and defense they could conceive, keeping in mind that every
dollar they paid to their policyholders was a dollar that could not be paid in
profits to their shareholders. And in cases where the policyholders
successfully defeated the literally dozens of defenses that insurers typically
asserted, insurers then forced their policyholders to litigate issues such as
“trigger,” “number of occurrences,” “allocation,” and “other insurance,” in
an attempt to avoid or minimize the amounts they were obligated to pay.161
One case I handled regarding a long-tail product liability claim with
over $200 million in damages, for example, involved dozens of insurers,
took over a decade to litigate, and required two trips to the Supreme Court
of Delaware before it was finally resolved.162 The final hold-out insurer,
aptly named Stonewall Insurance Company, was ordered to pay almost as
much in pre-judgment interest as the amount of its policy’s limits after its
scorched earth defense of the case, which included more than thirty
affirmative defenses, was litigated and finally tried more than ten years
after the case was commenced.163
The outcomes of such battles are very dependent upon which state’s
laws apply and in which court the fight is litigated.164 This is not a secret.
Consequently, as a final example of insurers’ commitment to increasing
their profits at the expense of their policyholders, insurers have added
choice of law and forum selection provisions to some of their policies in
order to tilt the battle field in their favor by forcing their policyholders to
try to collect for their losses only in the forums, and only under the laws,
most favorable to insurers.165
160. French, supra note 87, at 378–79 (discussing the structure of corporate
policyholders’ insurance programs); Christopher C. French, Segmented Settlements Are Not
the Answer: A Response to Professor Squire’s Article, How Collective Settlements
Camouflage the Costs of Shareholder Lawsuits, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 589, 611–13 (2013)
(same); Michael M. Marick, Excess Insurance: An Overview of General Principles and
Current Issues, 24 TORT & INS. L.J. 715, 718 (1989) (“Most major corporations purchase
multiple layers of excess insurance to cover losses potentially aggregating in the millions of
dollars.”).
161. See, e.g., French, supra note 87, at 380–85, 404 (discussing the different types of
triggers that courts have adopted); KALIS ET. AL., supra note 81, at § 3 (discussing insurers’
various defenses).
162. French, supra note 160, at 614–15; Stonewall Ins. Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 996 A.2d 1254 (Del. 2010).
163. Stonewall, 996 A.2d at 1256.
164. KALIS ET AL., supra note 81, at §26.03.
165. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 40, at 469 (discussing the use of arbitration clauses,
forum selection clauses, and choice of law clauses in commercial insurance forms).
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III. MINIMIZING THE IMPACT OF THE PROFIT IMPERATIVE ON
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURERS AND
POLICYHOLDERS
How can, or should, the role the profit imperative plays in risk
management be minimized or otherwise addressed? The answer to that
question is very complex and cannot be adequately covered in the context
of a single law review article. With that said, set forth below are a few
ideas to begin the discussion.

A.

Penalties Should Be Created to Incentivize Insurers to Pay Losses
Timely and in Full

Under the current laws, there is no down side risk for insurers that do
not pay their policyholders’ claims timely and in full. To the contrary,
unless the policyholder can prove the insurer acted in bad faith,166 which is
quite difficult to do under most states’ laws,167 an insurer that wrongfully

166. The standards for proving bad faith vary widely in jurisdictions throughout
America. Some jurisdictions require that the policyholder prove that the insurer acted
egregiously or with a dishonest intent, while others require the policyholder to prove that the
insurer acted “unreasonably” with respect to the handling or payment of a claim and that the
insurer knew or had reason to know that its behavior was unreasonable. See, e.g., JERRY &
RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 165–70 (explaining how the determination of bad faith often
centers around the unreasonableness of the insurer’s conduct but varies across jurisdictions);
Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and Litigation, 25 SETON
HALL L. REV. 74, 96–103 (1994) (discussing what constitutes bad faith and looking at
various standards set forth by the courts). With respect to decisions to deny coverage, many
courts apply a “fairly debatable” standard, which means there cannot be a finding of bad
faith unless it is so clear that the claim is covered that it is not even fairly debatable. See
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 166 (discussing the “fairly debatable” standard).
167. Many jurisdictions require that the insurer’s bad faith conduct be proven by the
policyholder with “clear and convincing evidence.” See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra
note 5, at 167 (explaining how some courts require the plaintiff to provide proof of bad faith
by “clear and convincing evidence”). Indeed, in most of the cases in which the policyholder
successfully proves the insurer acted in bad faith, the insurer’s misconduct involved much
more than, for example, the simple refusal to pay under a liability policy a reasonable
amount within policy limits to settle a claim asserted against the policyholder. See, e.g.,
Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967) (affirming a jury verdict of bad faith where
the insurer, in addition to refusing to accept a settlement demand within policy limits,
refused to settle even though the policyholder, a 70-year old widow, offered to contribute to
the settlement and ultimately attempting suicide after becoming indigent while attempting to
satisfy the judgment in excess of the policy’s limits entered against her); Birth Ctr. v. St.
Paul Cos., 787 A.2d 376 (Pa. 2001) (affirming a jury verdict of bad faith in a medical
malpractice case involving an injured baby where the insurer refused to settle within policy
limits due to its corporate practice of trying, instead of settling, all “bad baby cases,” despite
the insurer-appointed defense counsel recommending settlement and the presiding trial
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denies its policyholder’s claim, delays payment of the claim, or underpays
the claim is only liable for the amount underpaid plus some nominal
interest on that amount.168 Because there is no penalty for being wrong or
treating their policyholders poorly, insurers currently have little incentive
to pay claims timely or in full. To the contrary, the profit imperative
actually dictates that insurers delay claims payments as long as possible to
take advantage of the “float,” pay as little as possible for even legitimate
claims, and contest the payment of claims so long as the costs of doing so
are lower than the payment amounts being sought and there is not a
significant chance of being held liable for acting in bad faith.169 And, as
discussed above in Part II.C, this is exactly what insurers do.
To change the risk/benefit equation for insurers regarding the payment
of claims, penalties need to be created to incentivize insurers to pay timely
and in full. There are so many ways in which to do so that it could and
should be the subject of a separate article. However, here is one idea: a
law should be created to the effect that if the fact finder determines that the
value of a claim is greater than the amount paid or offered by the insurer,
then the insurer would be liable not only for the difference, but also for a
penalty, interest above market rates, and attorneys’ fees.170 For example, if
a loss is determined to be worth $1000 but the insurer only paid or offered
to pay $700, then the insurer would be liable for: (1) the additional $300
owed, (2) a 20% penalty on the unpaid $300,171 (3) interest on the unpaid
$300 calculated at the prime rate plus 5% from the date of the loss until the

judge informing the insurer that it was acting in bad faith by refusing to settle).
168. See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 161 (explaining that bad faith
remedies were created due to the “apparent inadequacy of contract remedies to compensate
insureds and deter insurers from elevating their own interests above their insureds.’”). In
order to actually be awarded a penalty such as punitive damages, however, in many
jurisdictions the policyholder must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the insurer
engaged in egregious, wanton misconduct. Id. at 167, 169.
169. See supra Part II.C. (explaining why insurers delay payments as long as possible).
170. I am not the only person to suggest that insurers should be penalized for failing to
pay the full value of claims timely. See, e.g., 2 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND
DISPUTES § 9:24 (6th ed. 2012) (“There are, in short, sound public policy reasons for
allowing an insured some type of ‘extra’ award when an insurance company unreasonably
refuses to . . . indemnify the insured, forcing him or her to go to the expense of establishing
the company’s error by means of litigation . . . . The most appropriate relief, therefore,
when an insurance company has acted unreasonably, is an award of attorney’s fees.”).
Indeed, some states have enacted statutes that impose penalties on insurers that fail to pay
their policyholders’ claims timely and in full under certain lines of insurance. See, e.g.,
RUSS & SEGULLA, supra note 96, at § 207:75 (citing Minnesota, Georgia, and Louisiana
cases and statutes).
171. Although I am proposing a 20% penalty in this Article as an illustration of how a
penalty system would work, it is notable that 20% is the penalty the United States imposes
on people who substantially underpay their taxes over the course of a tax year. 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 6662. If there is a gross underpayment, then the penalty is 40%. Id.
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date of final payment, and (4) the policyholder’s attorneys’ fees. The
prospect of being held liable for amounts significantly greater than their
existing contractual obligations in the absence of a finding of bad faith
should discourage insurers from: (1) collecting “float” income by delaying
the payment of claims and (2) forcing their policyholders to sue in order to
recover the full value of their losses.
B.

Certain Exclusions Should Be Eliminated from Policies and Insurers’
Ability to Refuse to Insure Certain Entities and People Should Be
Reduced

The hollowing out of coverage provided under socially critical lines of
insurance, such as property insurance through the addition of exclusions for
catastrophic and other risks that interfere with insurers’ fulfillment of the
profit imperative that has occurred over the past 40 years also should be
reversed. For example, homeowners policies, which are a social necessity
today, should be required to cover losses caused by floods and hurricanes.
The losses caused by these types of disasters are exactly the types of losses
that should be covered under such policies. Removing coverage for the
very types of losses that are most common and have the most devastating
impact on people, businesses, and communities is antithetical to the risk
transferring purpose of insurance.172 Insurers simply should not be allowed
to avoid fulfilling the purpose of insurance solely in the name of profits.
Thus, each of the numerous lines of insurance that currently exist
should be analyzed by state insurance commissioners to determine how
critical the line is to society. To that end, a task force could be created by
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners with representatives
from the insurance industry, legislatures, and consumer advocates to
examine the various lines of insurance. If a line of insurance is determined
to be a socially critical line of insurance, then insurers’ use of exclusions to
hollow out the coverage actually being provided should be closely
examined and each exclusion should be eliminated or narrowed as
appropriate.
Similarly, insurers’ ability to refuse to insure people or entities that
they have concluded are not adequately profitable because they are “bad
risks” also should be reduced or eliminated for socially critical lines of
insurance. In the absence of such controls on insurers, reverse adverse
selection has been employed by insurers such that only the most profitable
people and businesses can purchase insurance under many important lines
of insurance while the least profitable or unprofitable have been left

172. See supra Part I (explaining the dangers of excluding crucial risks).
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uninsured.173 These uninsured people and businesses are often the ones
who need insurance the most. There is no tenable defense for such a result.
Consequently, the restrictions placed on insurers’ ability to refuse to insure
certain people or businesses should be expanded beyond the few limitations
that currently exist for each line of insurance determined to be socially
critical.
Although not being done in a coordinated or comprehensive way, in
recent years we have begun to see some legislatures moving in the
direction of this proposal. For example, with respect to health insurance,
the Affordable Care Act has: (1) removed insurers’ ability to refuse to
insure certain people, (2) removed insurers’ ability to cancel insurance for
people who become sick and (3) reduced insurers’ ability to use reverse
173. Simply stated, adverse selection is “the disproportionate tendency of those who are
more likely to suffer losses to seek insurance against those losses.” Kenneth S. Abraham &
Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New
Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 102 n.82 (1993); see
also Baker, supra note 11, at 373, 375 (discussing how adverse selection results in high risk
individuals being disproportionately represented in insurance pools). Some critics of the
concept of adverse selection have argued that insurers’ alleged concerns regarding the
impact that adverse selection has on policyholders’ behavior are overblown. See, e.g., Peter
Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J.
1223, 1225 (2004) (arguing that while adverse selection in insurance markets is a
possibility, it is not as serious of a problem as some people suggest). The role adverse
selection has on insurers’ behavior, however, is quite significant. Insurers use adverse
selection—or more accurately, reverse adverse selection—to improve their profit margins.
Insurers use decades’ worth of claims data related to each line of insurance collected by the
entire insurance industry through ISO, detailed information regarding each prospective
policyholder that is collected through property reviews and applications for insurance, and
actuaries to create a risk profile for each prospective insured. See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra
note 6, at 14 (explaining how insurers use claims data); Siegelman, supra, at 1245, 1248–49,
1251–52, 1263 (discussing the sources of informational asymmetry between insurers and
insureds); Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 10, at 206, 209–11 (examining how insurers
gain information during the underwriting process and insurers’ informational advantages);
Baker, supra note 11, at 381 (describing an alternative approach where risk-based pricing
and underwriting would be limited or prohibited and the purchase of insurance would not
be required). Then, subject to some limited laws regarding discrimination based upon
protected categories, such as race, gender and genetics, insurers decide whether to insure the
person or business at all and if so, what premium to charge. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue,
supra note 10, at 204, 206 (discussing how insurers can adjust premiums based on
individual policyholder’s characteristics, ongoing behavior, and loss experience);
ABRAHAM, supra note 139, at 144–156 (discussing the various laws that prevent certain
types of discrimination in establishing rates or insuring people); Baker, supra note 11, at
377–79, 392 (discussing discrimination against battered women in the late 1980s and noting
that although risk classification is one of the most powerful competitive tools, it can create
reverse adverse selection). Indeed, if not for laws prohibiting it, insurers would, for
example, refuse to sell life, health and disability insurance to battered women because they
are more likely to suffer injuries and thus, are viewed as unprofitable, bad risks. Id. at 393.
Insurers also would use genetic profiling to avoid insuring certain people if it were not
prohibited. Id. at 394, n.53.
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adverse selection to charge certain risk classifications prohibitively
expensive premiums.174 Similarly, in a more limited way, it also has
happened for auto insurance in the sense that even drivers who private
insurers refuse to insure because insurers do not consider them adequately
profitable generally can still get a minimum amount of liability coverage
through state residual risk insurance pools.175
C.

State Sponsored Insurance Programs Could Be Created for Socially
Critical Lines of Insurance that Private Insurers Refuse to Sell

If the proposals set forth in Parts III.A and III.B were implemented,
would private insurers still sell the impacted lines of insurance? Maybe
not. So what then? As discussed below, that may not be a bad result
because state sponsored insurance programs could be created to fill the
voids and state sponsored insurance programs can fulfill the purpose of
insurance in ways that private insurers currently do not due to the profit
imperative, the nature of the risks involved and the current laws.
1.

Mutual Insurance Companies Are Not the Solution Even Though
They Theoretically Could Be Able to Fulfill the Purpose of
Insurance for Some Lines of Coverage

If the profit imperative is the primary source of conflict in risk
management today, is the solution to the profits over purpose conflict
simply to restrict the sale of insurance to only non-profit mutual
companies? Unfortunately, no.
Although the profit imperative does not impede mutual insurance

174. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARZ, ABRAHAM’S INSURANCE LAW &
REGULATION, HEALTH CARE SUPPLEMENT, at 20 (5th ed. 2010) (explaining the effect of the
Affordable Care Act on insurers).
175. See ABRAHAM, supra note 139, at 771–73. There are numerous additional
examples of legislatures enacting statutes to override policy exclusions. One example is that
most states have passed statutes that nullify the innocent co-insured exclusion insurers
added to property policies in an attempt to prevent innocent co-insureds from recovering
under policies for losses that were expected or intended by another insured. See, e.g.,
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 425–26 (noting that five states have adopted The
National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ model statute regarding innocent coinsureds and at least 36 other states have their own statutes). Another example is the State
of California’s refusal to enforce exclusions that would exclude coverage for a loss that is
concurrently caused by both an excluded peril and a covered peril where the efficient
proximate cause of the loss is a covered peril. See West’s Ann. Cal. Ins. Code § 530 (not
allowing anti-concurrent causation exclusions to remove coverage where the efficient
proximate cause of a loss is covered); Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 770 P.2d
704 (Cal. 1989) (holding that the facts at issue required the jury to conduct an efficient
proximate cause analysis to determine liability).
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companies in the way that it does publicly traded stock companies, mutual
companies are hamstrung by their inability to raise capital quickly and to
accumulate it.176 Consequently, although it might be possible over a very
long period of time to accumulate the capital necessary to insure
catastrophic risks such as floods, earthquakes and hurricanes, it would be
difficult for most mutual companies to earn and retain the necessary capital
needed to insure such risks. That inability to quickly and easily raise
capital was one of the primary drivers of the shift from mutual insurance
companies to publicly traded stock insurance companies.177
In addition, many members (i.e., policyholders) of mutual companies
who are not likely to suffer a catastrophic loss prefer premium reductions
or dividends if the company has surplus capital so even mutual companies
have pressures that impede their ability to accumulate the large amounts of
capital needed to cover catastrophic losses.178 Thus, although the mutual
company form theoretically may be fine for some lines of insurance such as
automobile and life insurance, which have high frequency but low loss
values and thus do not need large capital reserves to pay claims, mutual
companies are not a good vehicle through which to insure catastrophic risks
despite the availability of catastrophe bonds and reinsurance for some
portions of their risk portfolios.179
Putting aside the issue of adequate capitalization, however, why would
mutual companies be the answer to the conflict between the profit
imperative and the purpose of insurance in risk management for any lines
of insurance in light of the fact that mutual companies currently behave
quite similarly to publicly traded stock companies with respect to the
payment of claims and the use of exclusions and adverse selection to avoid
covering certain risks and people?180 One possible answer is that, in order
to compete with publicly traded stock companies, mutual companies have
been forced to behave like publicly traded stock companies. Thus, if
mutual companies did not have to compete with publicly traded stock
companies, then mutual companies theoretically could return to their

176. Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 216–17.
177. See supra Part I.B. (explaining the rise of publically traded stock insurance
companies).
178. Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 214.
179. There is some uncertainty as to whether the reinsurance market has the capacity to
completely reinsure the amounts necessary to ensure proper capitalization for some
catastrophic risks. See Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 217, 223 (discussing the
uncertain capacity of the reinsurance market and three states’ approaches to help remedy the
problem).
180. See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 64, 97, 106–09, 138–40, 145, 158, 163
(describing the claims payment practices of State Farm, a mutual insurance company and
one of the largest insurers in America, and concluding that it does not act “like a good
neighbor”).
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original purpose of serving as a social safety net by acting as an
intermediary on behalf of a group of businesses or people by creating and
managing a pool of money created by the group in order to pay the losses
of the unfortunate few.
As things currently stand, however, in order to compete with publicly
traded stock companies for business, mutual insurance companies must
spend enormous sums on advertising just like publicly traded stock
companies do. They also must charge competitive premium rates because
that is the only means by which consumers currently can compare insurers.
Purchasers of insurance today cannot effectively compare insurers on
anything other than premium rates due to: (1) the proliferation of ISO’s
standardized insurance policy forms which both mutual companies and
publicly traded stock companies use181 and (2) insurers’ effective
concealment of their claims payment practices because the insurance
industry’s powerful lobbyists thus far have convinced state insurance
commissioners not to make such information publicly available based upon
the argument that such information is confidential, propriety business
information.182 As discussed above in Part II.C, premiums are based
primarily upon the projected claims payments because the amounts paid on
claims are by far insurers’ greatest expenses. Consequently, in order to
compete with for-profit insurance companies, mutual insurance companies
have been forced to adopt similar claims payment practices in order to keep
their costs down to allow them to charge competitive premium rates. In the
words of one mutual company’s Vice President of Claims, “if our
competition settles claims for less money than we do, we stand a good
chance of being non-competitive . . . .”183 The same competitive premium
rate pressures also force mutual companies to refuse to insure high-risk
people because the overall premium rates for the entire risk pool would go
up if they did.
In short, competition with publicly traded stock companies has forced
mutual companies to behave like publicly traded stock companies in a race
to the bottom with respect to the amounts paid for claims and the
availability of coverage for higher risk people and certain perils. If mutual

181. See supra note 46, and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 38–40 (discussing how insurance companies
closely guard data on lawsuits for unfair claims practices); Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently
Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61
UCLA L. REV. 394, 415–20 (2014) (discussing the need for the disclosure of insurers’
claims payment practices in order to allow consumers to make more informed insurance
purchasing decisions).
183. G. Robert Mecherle, Vice President of Claims, State Farm, Remarks at the State
Farm Divisional Claim Superintendents Conference (1986), quoted in FEINMAN, supra note
6, at 64.
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companies did not have to compete with publicly traded stock companies
for customers and individual insurers’ claims payment practices were
disclosed to the public, then one would expect that mutual companies could
and would change their practices such that they could be part of the answer
to the profits over purpose problem at least with respect to some lines of
insurance.
2.

Correlated Risk Concerns and the Profit Imperative Result in
Insurers Taking a Narrow View of the Relevant Time Horizon
and Geographic Area in Which to Measure the Profitability of
Insuring Certain Risks

It should not be unexpected that insurers may refuse to sell insurance
that is required to cover all types of catastrophes, including floods,
earthquakes and hurricanes, because insurers contend such catastrophic
risks cannot be insured profitably because they are highly correlated risks
that occur in geographically localized areas.184 Thus, insurers contend that
they are unable to adequately spread the risk of loss across enough
policyholders because most or all of the policyholders in an affected area
suffer similar losses at the same time and, due to adverse selection, people
or businesses that are not located in areas prone to such risks will not
purchase insurance so there are not enough “fortunate” policyholders that
pay premiums to cover the losses of the “unfortunate” policyholders.185
In using this justification, however, insurers largely must ignore the
fact that they now have much larger geographic footprints than they did
decades ago and they have reinsurance to cover a portion or all of the
losses of their entire portfolios of business (i.e., all of the losses of their
policyholders in the impacted area as well as non-impacted areas). The
reinsurance market today is dominated by companies that insure other
insurers on a global basis, which means the localized risk of a flood
impacting an underlying insurer in one area of the world is actually spread
across people and businesses throughout the entire world.186 Insurers today
also can further spread the risk of loss through the sale of catastrophe
bonds. Thus, unlike years ago when insurers’ businesses were much more
localized, the correlated risk of loss in a local area today is in many
respects overstated because the “fortunate” majority of policyholders that
pay premiums to cover the losses of the “unfortunate” few policyholders
184. See Cummins, supra note 4, at 343 (discussing how risks that are locally dependent
may be globally independent).
185. See, e.g., Cummins, supra note 4, at 342–43 (describing an insurance statistical
model and its relation to the law of large numbers); Bruggeman et al., supra note 105, at 187
(discussing the role of reinsurance in funding insurance losses for catastrophes).
186. Cummins, supra note 4, at 343.
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are actually spread across the entire world.187 Nonetheless, because
reinsurance and catastrophe bonds may not be viewed by insurers as a
complete answer to the correlated risk problem (e.g., reinsurers may refuse
to cover insurers that insure catastrophic risks or markets for catastrophe
bonds may be weak in years following catastrophes), insurers may refuse to
sell insurance if they are not allowed to exclude coverage for catastrophic
risks.
Even if the correlated risk problem did not dissuade insurers from
selling insurance that is required to cover catastrophic risks, insurers still
may decline to sell such insurance because their shareholders demand
profitability in both the short-term and long-term. Paying losses caused by
catastrophes results in uneven earnings for insurers. Thus, profitability
cannot be ensured in the short-term and, instead, it is likely there will be
periods of unprofitability.188
Yet, the fact that catastrophes may result in periods of short-term
unprofitability does not necessarily mean that catastrophic risks cannot or
should not be insured. To determine the financial feasibility of insuring
catastrophes, one should not consider the profitability of such lines of
insurance during just the narrow time period immediately following a
catastrophe.189 Hurricanes, for example, happen infrequently in the same
exact geographic location. Indeed, despite the fact that hurricanes are
coming ashore somewhere every year, insurers have been collecting
insurance premiums from people and businesses that are located in the
afflicted areas for many years, if not decades, before a hurricane hits the
area. Insurers collected thirty-six years of premiums from New Orleans
residents between Hurricane Camille and Hurricane Katrina.190
Consequently, in measuring the financial viability of property insurance
that covers hurricanes, instead of considering the profitability of the
insurance during just the time period immediately following the date when
a hurricane hits, one should consider the profits and losses of the line of

187. Id.
188. Indeed, undercapitalized insurers that cover catastrophic losses can suffer such
devastating losses in the short-term that they can become insolvent. For example, several
undercapitalized insurers became insolvent following Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Cole et
al., supra note 119, at 266.
189. See, e.g., Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 206, 208 (discussing how dynamic
premium strategies based on only a few years of experience will lead to highly variable loss
ratios in some years in the context of insuring catastrophes).
190. Insurers’ claims regarding the alleged lack of profitability of insuring catastrophes
are demonstrably overstated. Even in 2005, the year of Hurricane Katrina, property/casualty
insurance companies had record profits of $48.8 billion and $68.1 billion the following year.
See FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 149 (citing Testimony of J. Robert Hunter before the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the United States Senate, p. 11
(April 11, 2007)).
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insurance over the course of the many decades in which insurers received
premiums and investment income from those premiums before and after
the hurricane hit. If one did so, one just might find that selling property
insurance in New Orleans during the past fifty years actually was
profitable.
Nonetheless, the profit imperative and shareholder pressures
discourage private insurers from covering catastrophic risks for the reasons
discussed above. Consequently, it should be expected that insurers may
decline to sell insurance that is required to cover catastrophes.
3.

The Current Laws Create Financial Disincentives for Private
Insurers to Fulfill the Purpose of Insurance that Would Not
Apply to State Sponsored Insurance Programs

In addition to shareholders’ myopic focus on profitability in the shortterm and the correlated risk problem associated with catastrophes, it is
difficult for many insurers to accumulate and maintain the capital necessary
to handle large-scale catastrophes under the current laws. First, the current
tax laws effectively discourage insurers from accumulating capital to pay
future losses. The income generated by insurers that could be set aside to
pay future losses is taxed.191 Then, if that income is not paid to
shareholders in the form of dividends, the income generated by the money
set aside for future unrealized losses is taxed as well.192 Second, companies
that have accumulated surplus capital, which is what insurance companies
need to do in order to cover the losses associated with catastrophes, become
takeover targets for corporate raiders that think the capital has a better use
than simply sitting there unused while being taxed.193 Third, the accounting
rules do not allow insurers to set aside reserves for the payment of future
claims if the losses giving rise to the claims have not yet occurred.194
Consequently, the cumulative result of these laws is that the surplus
earnings of insurers are paid to shareholders as dividends or to managers as
bonuses, so the companies may not have adequate surplus capital to cover
catastrophic losses, which is another reason it should be expected that
191. See, e.g., Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 212, 222 (explaining why insurance
companies are not incentivized to accumulate funds for catastrophes); Cummins, supra note
4, at 371.
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 212–13 (discussing how other
companies can purchase a cash rich insurance company, use the cash reserve and then shut
down the insurance company).
194. See, e.g., Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 209, 222 (discussing Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement No. 5 Accounting for Contingencies, which
precludes an insurance company from earmarking capital surplus to pay for future
catastrophic losses that have not yet occurred); Cummins, supra note 4, at 371–72.
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insurers may decline to sell insurance that is required to cover
catastrophes.195
If private insurers were to refuse to sell socially critical lines of
insurance in a legal regime in which: (1) the insurance sold was required to
cover catastrophic risks, (2) insurers could not refuse to insure people or
businesses that are able to pay premiums, and (3) insurers would be subject
to penalties for failing to pay the full value of losses timely, then state
sponsored insurance programs may need to be created to fill the voids.
Instead of being a negative outcome, however, this might actually be a
good result because state sponsored insurance programs could be a better
vehicle for providing insurance for some lines of insurance than mutual or
stock companies.
For example, state sponsored insurance programs would be good for
insuring catastrophic risks. Because premium income would not be paid to
shareholders in the form of dividends or stock repurchases, state sponsored
insurance programs could accumulate the capital needed to pay large
catastrophic losses caused by disasters such as floods, hurricanes and
earthquakes. And, the accumulation of capital would not make state
sponsored insurance programs takeover targets because such programs
would not, of course, be available for purchase by corporate raiders.
Further, state sponsored insurance programs also would not be subject to
the tax and accounting rules that discourage publicly traded stock
companies and mutual companies from accumulating capital. Thus, state
sponsored insurance programs would not be subject to many of the legal
impediments that private insurers currently must overcome in order to
cover catastrophic risks.
4.

State Sponsored Insurance Programs Could Reduce Moral
Hazard and Adverse Selection Concerns

State sponsored insurance programs also can address adverse selection
and moral hazard196 concerns more efficiently than private insurers can.

195. Jaffee & Russell, supra note 102, at 212.
196. The concept of moral hazard captures the intuitive idea that a policyholder will
have a “tendency to take fewer precautions in the presence of insurance.” Adam F. Scales,
The Chicken and the Egg: Kenneth S. Abraham’s “The Liability Century,” 94 VA. L. REV.
1259, 1263 (2008) (book review) (reviewing and citing KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE
LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 45–
48 (2008)). Judge Easterbrook has described the theory underlying the concept by stating
that “once a person has insurance, he will take more risks than before because he bears less
of the cost of his conduct.” W. Cas. & Sur. Co. v. W. World Ins. Co., 769 F.2d 381, 385 (7th
Cir. 1985). The term “moral hazard” also generally encompasses situations where “[a]
person . . . deliberately causes a loss . . . [or] exaggerates the size of a claim to defraud an
insurer.” DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 480 (8th ed.
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For example, states have the power and incentive to make insurance
mandatory to ensure satisfactory participation rates. Thus, to the extent
adverse selection is a concern, by making the insurance mandatory, that
concern could be eliminated.197 The Affordable Care Act is an example of
this.198
Similarly, state sponsored insurance programs should have more
power and ability to regulate policyholders’ behavior than private insurers
do. Thus, states could either mandate or reward policyholders to take
specified loss-prevention activities.199 An example of this on the federal
level is the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, which
incentivizes policyholders who are covered under the NFIP program to
rebuild their homes above flood heights by charging them significantly
lower premiums if they do so.200 Although private insurers can regulate
policyholders’ behavior in some ways,201 one advantage state sponsored
insurance programs have over private insurers on this point is that future
owners of the property also would benefit from premium reductions for
preventative measures taken by prior owners. Unless the subsequent owner
purchases insurance from the same insurer as the previous owner, that may
or may not be true because private insurers do not have uniform premium
guidelines so the premium discounts that one insurer provides may not be
2005). Numerous scholars have written articles regarding moral hazard and offered similar
descriptions of the concept. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and Economics of Tort
Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 338 n.117 (1990) (“‘Moral hazard’ is
sometimes distinguished from ‘morale hazard’, the former referring to deliberate acts like
arson, the latter to the mere relaxation of the defendant’s discipline of carefulness.”) (citing
C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR. & RICHARD M. HEINS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 217
(4th ed. 1981); Scott E. Harrington, Prices and Profits in the Liability Insurance Market, in
LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY, 42, 47 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds.,
1988) (“Moral hazard is the tendency for the presence and characteristics of insurance
coverage to produce inefficient changes in buyers’ loss prevention activities, including
carelessness and fraud . . . .”); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 12 (“The existence of
insurance could have the perverse effect of increasing the probability of loss . . . . This
phenomenon is called moral hazard.”); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and
Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1547 (1987) (“Moral hazard refers to the effect of the
existence of insurance itself on the level of insurance claims made by the insured . . . Ex
ante moral hazard is the reduction in precautions taken by the insured to prevent the loss,
because of the existence of insurance.”).
197. Bruggeman et al., supra note 105, at 211, 217.
198. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ supra note 174 (explaining the effect of the
Affordable Care Act on insurers).
199. Id.; Bruggeman et al., supra note 105, at 217.
200. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4015; See also National Flood Insurance Program, Can We Afford to
Rebuild Higher? Can We Afford Not To?, FEMA, available at http://www.fema.gov/medialibrary-data/20130726-1910-25045-7987/fema_datasheet_rebuild_aezone05.pdf (explaining
the link between National Flood Insurance Program premiums and flood risk).
201. See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 10 (explaining the ways insurers can regulate
and shape the behavior of their policyholders).
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provided by another.202
In short, state sponsored insurance plans can address moral hazard and
adverse selection concerns in ways that private insurers cannot.
5.

State Sponsored Insurance Programs Should Have Lower
Premiums

Another advantage that should result from the creation of state
sponsored insurance programs is lower premiums. Because private
insurers compete for business, a significant portion of the premiums
collected by both publicly traded stock companies and mutual companies
goes to sales commissions for insurance agents.203 Indeed, it has been
reported that insurers currently pay as much as 20% of the premiums they
collect in sales commissions.204
Insurers also currently spend significant amounts of the premiums
they collect on advertising.205 Who has not seen the TV commercials that
run over and over again in high priced ad slots during prime time in which
GEICO claims that “spending 15 minutes could save you 15% or more on
car insurance” or Progressive’s ads intended to help policyholders save on
premiums by avoiding “rate suckers” (depicted by people jumping on
vehicles and sucking on them) or Flo, the bubbly Progressive salesperson,
exhorting customers to try a “snapshot” or to save money by “bundling”?
In fact, the fifty largest insurers spend approximately $2.5 billion a year on
advertising.206
Once a person has been induced to apply for insurance due to ads and
insurance salesmen plying for the person’s business, insurers then spend
significant amounts of money in the underwriting process in an attempt to
weed out the “bad risks” (i.e., the people most likely to have claims).207 If
insurance were mandatory and it were sold by state sponsored programs,
then very little money would need to be spent on underwriting efforts
designed to avoid selling insurance to bad risks because the bad risks
would be included in the insurance pool.
State sponsored insurance programs also should result in lower
premiums because they would not need to spend as much money
investigating and litigating their policyholders’ claims in order to maximize

202. Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, The Benefits of Introducing a Mandatory State
Hurricane Insurance Scheme in Florida 14 (HEC Working Papers in Economics, 2009).
203. Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 202, at 10. Cole et al., supra note 119, at 271.
204. Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 202, at 10.
205. Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 202, at 11, 17; Cole et al., supra note 119, at 271.
206. FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 54.
207. Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 202, at 13, 17; Cole et al., supra note 119, at 271;
Bruggeman et al., supra note 105, at 211, 217.
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profits for shareholders. Insurers spend approximately 12% of the
premiums they collect investigating, contesting and litigating claims.208
Fighting claims makes good business sense for publicly traded stock
insurance companies because every dollar insurers can avoid paying on
claims increases insurers’ profitability.209 That would not be the case for
state sponsored insurance programs because they would not be governed by
the profit imperative and instead would only need to verify the validity of a
claim before paying it.
In sum, if insurance were sold by state sponsored programs, then all of
the money private insurers currently spend on sales commissions, high
priced ads, underwriting and aggressive claims handling would be
unnecessary. Those savings could be directly passed on to policyholders in
the form of lower premiums.
6.

European State Sponsored Insurance Programs as Models for
America

Although unlikely to be a source of inspiration in light of Europe’s
current economic climate in which many countries in Europe are still in a
recession and several European countries’ financial solvency remains in
question, in order to understand what a successful state sponsored
insurance program would look like, one can look to Europe. Switzerland,
Spain, France and Germany are examples of countries that successfully
have implemented state sponsored insurance programs.210
For example, Spain has a state sponsored insurance program known as
“the Consorcio.”211 The Consorcio insures all properties in Spain against a
wide range of catastrophes.212 The Consorcio covers both natural
catastrophes and unnatural catastrophes such as terrorist attacks.213 The
insurance is mandatory and the policy issued is standardized.214 The total
administrative costs of the program for sales, underwriting and claims
administration are only 10% of the premiums collected.215
Under European state sponsored insurance programs, the policyholder
and insurer are not adversaries when it comes to the payment of claims
208. Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 202, at 11.
209. See FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 2, 5. Insurers’ aggressive claims investigation and
payment practices do not hurt their bottom lines in the form of lost customers caused by
gaining a reputation for unfair claims payment practices because the information regarding
insurers claims payment practices is not disclosed to the public. Id. at 7, 39–40.
210. Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 202, at 4.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 4, 10, 11.
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because the insurer does not have shareholders pushing for increased
dividend distributions which can be achieved only if the insurer nickels and
dimes its policyholders when it comes to paying claims. Consequently,
empirical studies have shown that European citizens have a high degree of
customer satisfaction regarding the amount and timeliness of the payment
of their claims.216
In contrast, in the United States, policyholders and their insurers spend
millions of dollars engaged in endless litigation whenever catastrophes hit.
For example, whenever a hurricane comes ashore and brings flooding with
it, litigation ensues regarding whether the damage to homes was caused by
flooding (an excluded peril) versus wind (a covered peril).217 More than
6,600 lawsuits were filed in federal court in New Orleans in connection
with Hurricane Katrina.218 In Mississippi, one insurer involved in the
Hurricane Katrina litigation filed a motion to transfer the lawsuits out of
Mississippi on the basis of a survey that showed that 49% of the people in
southern Mississippi “believe that insurance executives are on the same
level as child molesters.”219 The Louisiana Department of Insurance
received 20,000 complaints per month during the six-month period
following the storm.220 Thus, it is an understatement to say there is a high
degree of dissatisfaction with insurers’ handling and payment of claims in
the United States.221 If American state sponsored insurance programs could
216. Id. at 13.
217. Id. at 14; French, supra note 97, at 243 (discussing the “ensuing loss” clause’s
potential impact on wind versus water disputes for hurricane claims); Erik S. Knutsen,
Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for Catastrophic Losses, 61 ALA. L.
REV. 957, 959–60 (2010) (discussing concurrent causation with respect to, among other
issues, wind versus water damage caused by hurricanes). See also Leonard v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 430–31 (5th Cir. 2007) (analyzing an anti-concurrent causation
exclusion in a wind versus water dispute following Hurricane Katrina); Corban v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 20 So. 3d 601, 617–18 (Miss. 2009) (same). Notably, because private
insurers handle claims under the National Flood Insurance Program on behalf of the federal
government, many insurers that issued homeowners policies were responsible for estimating
the repair costs for both the federal flood policies under the NFIP program and the insurers’
homeowners policies. When estimating the cost to remove and replace drywall, for
example, the profit imperative drove one insurer to calculate the cost at $0.76 per square
foot when the costs would be charged to its homeowners policy and $3.31 per square foot
when it would be charged to the federal flood program. See FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 165
(describing risk aversion in insurance).
218. FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 147.
219. Id. at 145 (quoting Benick, The Flood After the Storm: The Hurricane Katrina
Homeowners’ Insurance Litigation, 4 BUS. L. BRIEF (Am. U.) 51 (Fall 2007)).
220. Id. at 147.
221. Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 202, at 14. Although insurers collect and report
information regarding the complaints they receive with respect to their claims handling
practices to state insurance commissioners, the full extent of consumer dissatisfaction with
insurers’ claims handling practices is unknown because insurers refuse to disclose such
information, and thus far, they have convinced state insurance commissioners not to disclose
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duplicate the success of European state sponsored programs with respect to
the handling and payment of claims, then policyholders in America would
have a much higher satisfaction rate than they currently do with respect to
the payment of losses.
D.

Impediments to the Reforms Necessary to Address the Conflict
between the Profit Imperative and the Purpose of Insurance in Risk
Management

The impediments to the implementation of the reforms to insurance
law discussed in this Article are considerable. First, imposing penalties on
an insurer that breaches its contract of insurance by failing to pay the full
amount of a policyholder’s loss in a timely manner without a finding that
the insurer acted in bad faith is simply inconsistent with existing law
regarding damages for breach of contract, which generally does not provide
for an award of penalties or extra contractual damages.222 Thus, in order
for legislatures to embrace this extra-contractual damage award, there
would need to be a broader recognition that insurance policies are not
simply contracts, but rather, they occupy a role of great social importance
as social safety nets and they are not actually “negotiated” contracts by two
parties to accommodate the desires of the parties regarding the transfer of
risk.223 Until that happens, it will be difficult to convince legislatures to
create disincentives for insurers to pursue the fulfillment of the profit
imperative by paying as little as possible on their policyholders’ losses as
late as possible.
Second, because it is widely believed that the losses caused by
catastrophes are correlated risks that cannot be insured profitably,224 it will
be difficult to overcome the powerful insurance industry lobbyists’
opposition to the elimination of exclusions for such risks. Similarly,
insurers likely will cite freedom of contract and the purported
unprofitability of insuring certain risks to support the continued use of
exclusions for other non-catastrophic risks of loss such as environmental
damages and asbestos liabilities. Insurance regulators generally have

such information either. See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 216–17; Schwarcz, supra note
182, at 415–420 (discussing the need for transparency in claims handling practices).
222. See, e.g., Mannheimer Bros. v. Kansas Cas. & Sur. Co., 184 N.W. 189, 191 (1921)
(“the general rule [is] that the measure of damages for breach of a contract for the payment
of money is the amount agreed to be paid with interest”); Restatement (Second), Contracts,
§§346-56 (1979) (addressing the various damages available for breach of contract, which do
not include penalties).
223. See supra Part I (highlighting the social importance of insurance).
224. See supra Parts II.B.1 and III.C.2 (explaining the belief of insurers that insuring
catastrophic events is not profitable).
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accepted such arguments in the past, as evidenced by the fact that the ISO
policy forms that contain such exclusions have been widely approved.225
Third, the creation of state sponsored insurance programs in America
for socially critical lines of insurance likely would face immense political
opposition in many states. Many Americans highly value freedom of
choice and capitalism, and if people think they will be left with only state
sponsored insurance programs if the laws were changed along the lines
discussed in this Article, then such a regime likely would face significant
opposition. Indeed, look at what has happened with the Affordable Care
Act. It was passed only when Congress was heavily Democratic and has
been subjected to dozens of efforts to repeal it since Republicans obtained a
majority in the House of Representatives. If something as important as
ensuring that sick people are able to obtain health care in this country has
been met with so much political resistance, then there is little reason for
optimism that the political will exists at this juncture for legislation to be
passed that might result in private insurers leaving certain insurance
markets.
Fourth, another major objection to state sponsored insurance programs
is that capitalism generally allocates resources in the most efficient manner
through competition and incentives to eliminate waste. Indeed, to prove
why governments should not be selling insurance in the United States, one
only needs to consider the National Flood Insurance Program. The NFIP
has been a poster-child example of why government should not be in the
business of insurance. The NFIP historically used outdated floodplain
maps due to a lack of funds needed to create accurate ones so in many
instances the wrong homes were insured or uninsured.226 The NFIP also
has been actuarially unsound, which has led to frequent periods of
insolvency.227 In addition, because the program is voluntary, participation
has been poor, and it also has been noted that many homes covered under
the program get flooded repeatedly and the homeowners do not take steps
to prevent flood damage.228 Consequently, if insurance were only about the
most efficient allocation of resources and administration of a profitable
business, then the case for private insurers selling insurance instead of
governments could be made simply by saying “NFIP.”
Perhaps, with the changes to the NFIP made by the Biggert-Waters
Flood Reform Act of 2012 that were designed to address such problems, in
time the NFIP will be a model government insurance program instead of a
225. See supra Part II (highlighting the freedom of contract argument frequently made
by insurers).
226. See supra Part II.B.2 and accompanying notes (highlighting problems with the
government acting as an insurer).
227. Id.
228. Id.
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justification for private insurance. For now, however, its past failures
decrease the chances that state sponsored insurance programs on a national
scale will be embraced.229
Thus, because America’s history with
government sponsored insurance programs generally has been poor, one
should not expect that state sponsored insurance programs would be
warmly embraced despite the benefits of such programs and the numerous
shortcomings of private insurance that are discussed in this Article.
CONCLUSION
The profit imperative has undermined the role of insurance in risk
management in recent years. Insurance originally was intended to serve as
a social safety net to ensure that people who cannot afford to bear the
financial risk of disasters could transfer and spread that risk across a
community of people or businesses in exchange for the payment of a
certain loss, a premium. That purpose cannot be fulfilled when the goal of
insurers—entities that originally in America were only administrators of
the pools of premium money created by policyholders for the benefit of the
unfortunate few in the policyholders’ communities—is the maximization of
profits for their shareholders with little regard for the policyholders’ or
society’s interests.
As the insurance industry has become dominated by publicly traded
stock companies, the profit imperative has dictated that insurers refuse to
insure members of society and risks that do not satisfy their profit margin
goals.
The profit imperative also has forced insurers and their
policyholders to be adversaries when it comes to paying the policyholders’
losses because any amounts paid for losses are amounts that cannot be paid
to shareholders as profits.
There is no tenable reason why insurance cannot fulfill its intended
229. One response to the opponents of state sponsored insurance programs who will
point to the NFIP when explaining why government sponsored insurance programs are a
bad idea in America is that there are existing examples of successful state sponsored
insurance programs. One such example, and this is not to suggest that the program is either
flawless or above criticism, is Florida’s property insurance program that is administered by
Citizens Property Insurance Corporation. It offers property insurance to homeowners in
Florida at premium rates significantly lower than the private market because: (1) it does not
need to provide an adequate return to investors; (2) it is tax exempt; (3) it does not need to
raise excessive amounts of capital to pre-fund losses because it has the ability to do postloss assessments; and (4) it is reinsured by a state sponsored reinsurer, the Florida Hurricane
Catastrophe Fund. See, e.g., Cole et al., supra note 119, at 267–71 (discussing the
advantages and disadvantages of post loss catastrophe financing). Despite problems in the
past and the fact that the State of Florida has been pounded by hurricanes year after year, the
program continues to successfully provide property insurance to the state’s residents where
private insurers, both publicly traded stock companies and mutual companies, generally
have refused to do so or failed.
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purpose and role in risk management today as it originally was intended
when it was first introduced in America. Three changes to the law could
accomplish this goal. One, penalties should be allowed to be imposed on
insurers that do not pay losses timely and in full to overcome the profit
imperative’s mandate to pay as little as possible for losses and to delay
payment as long as possible because there currently is no downside to
doing so under the existing laws. Two, for socially critical lines of
insurance, insurers’ ability to refuse insure people, businesses or risks they
deem to be inadequately profitable should be reduced or eliminated. Three,
if insurers are unwilling to sell insurance subject to these first two changes,
then state sponsored insurance programs for socially critical lines of
insurance should be created to fill the void.
State sponsored insurance programs may actually be a better source
for socially critical lines of insurance than private insurers. State sponsored
insurance programs would not need to spend billions of dollars annually on
advertising, sales commissions, underwriting, investigating and contesting
claims; thus, the cost of such insurance should be lower. State sponsored
insurance programs also could accumulate capital tax-free to pay
catastrophic losses without reprisals from shareholders or attacks by
corporate raiders. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, under state
sponsored insurance programs the claims adjustment process should not be
as adversarial because such programs would not be driven by the profit
imperative which forces insurers to fight with their policyholders regarding
the payment of losses because each dollar paid for losses is a dollar that
cannot be paid to shareholders or managers as dividends or bonuses. Thus,
instead of fighting with their insurers over money in the wake of
catastrophes, policyholders could focus their energy on rebuilding and
moving on with their lives.

